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Agriculture remains a key component of economic development, but the method-
ology for how development policies are determined has changed for developing coun-
tries. In the last decade, the focus of economic growth in developing countries has
shifted from country-wide prescriptions to testable micro-development programs at
the local level. As international development focuses in on local programs, social
networks have been identied as a key component for their eective deployment.
This dissertation analyzes the eects of a social network-based intervention.
It contributes to the economics literature on identifying social network eects by
implementing a randomized encouragement design to develop social capital, while
simultaneously introducing a new method of development training. The program
implemented here is comprised of two parts, and was conducted with female-headed
households in rural Uganda, that were growing a relatively new cash crop, cotton.
The rst part conducted social network-based information games in 20 sample vil-
lages, in which each participant was trained in one aspect of cultivating cotton, and
encouraged to attain a full set of knowledge on growing cotton through her assigned
learning networks. They were presented with two dierent incentives schemes for
accumulating information: competitive and team incentives.
The second portion of the program paired the surveyed individuals at random
with other game participants. These pairs were encouraged to develop team goals
across the growing season and a time schedule for networking as well as update and
share their learned information from the games on a regular basis. The estimated
eects of the SNI, which comprise this dissertation, include both the eects from
the information games and the eects of the mentored pairing; that is, the impact
of acquiring one information point and one new link. I compare the eects of this
program to a standard agricultural training program that was concurrently con-
ducted during this research, in which extension agents taught the same information
that was presented in the information games but with a traditional classroom-based
teaching method.
My games analysis shows that females learn more when presented with com-
petitive incentives. The total number of learning points learned during competitive
incentives rst order stochastically dominates the total number of learning points
learned during team incentives. However, for the dissemination of one specic in-
formation point, team incentives are better at ensuring that a unique information
point reaches the entire group. Dierence in dierence estimates, controlling for the
training program, show that the overall SNI program had signicant eects on the
average farmer, with diminishing returns for higher yielding farmers. I nd that
these average eects are comparable to the eects of the conventional training pro-
gram, but at a fth of the implementation cost. A closer examination shows that the
SNI program has its most signicant eect for farmers growing around the average
output when the program was started in 2009 (100-200 kgs/acre), while the Training
program has its greatest and most signicant impact for those yielding above the
average output in 2009. Therefore, the two programs are not necessarily substitutes
in how they eect change. My research shows that a competitive incentive struc-
ture coupled with social network-based learning serves as an eective paradigm for
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In the last decade, social network-based technologies have become an impor-
tant tool for disseminating information. In the developed world, the average person
spends a considerable amount of time remotely researching what others are doing
and learning from neighbors, friends, and even friends-of-friends-of-friends. Expand-
ing one's network can be as simple as clicking accept. As a result, rst-degree
networks in the developed world can incorporate geographically distant individuals,
with the irony that next-door neighbors may never interact.
In both of these worlds, networks are extremely powerful in initiating the ow
of information. In the developing world, the idea of observing and learning through
one's social networks is hardly an innovation, but rather a staple for survival. This
is particularly true within agriculture, the primary source of livelihood in the rural
developing world. While programs aimed at increasing agricultural productivity are
regarded as a powerful means to reducing poverty, the dissemination of new tech-
niques and technologies by agricultural extension agents and trainers is one of the
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weakest links in the process.
One of the reasons for the lack of clear success in agricultural extension train-
ing is that trainers' success in reaching and aecting all individuals in a particular
location relies on the eectiveness of social networks, which are often unknown to
an outsider and dicult to identify. While extension agents may bring new tech-
nologies with each program, extension agents can often have a misconception as
to what is important to local production and how to disseminate the new technol-
ogy. It is through individuals' personal ties that external information is disseminated
within a remote area, tested and localized, ultimately creating usable and believable
knowledge. Thus, many welfare-improving technologies are never adopted because
individuals are not connected to eective social networks.
This paper examines a research project that measures the impact of social
capital for female subsistence farmers in rural Uganda. Identifying the impacts of
social capital generally suers from serious identication problems. Unobservable
characteristics of an individual, such as networking ability and sociability, and/or
unobservable weather shocks, confound the impact of network eects, and bias the
estimated impact of social network measures. The novelty behind this study is that
I am able to randomly perturb females' networks, creating a source of network iden-
tication. This was done by encouraging one new randomly assigned link for each
participating female farmer, in addition to being taught about one new randomly
assigned aspect of growing cotton. This random assignment of partners and in-
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formation directly addresses the identication problem that plagues most network
studies. In the context of the economics literature, my identication of network
eects captures the net result of network's churning1, and not the eect of any par-
ticular network structure, or the structural positioning of nodes.
There is a large body of literature that does detail the importance of a net-
work's structure, and the impact of a node's position in that structure. For instance,
Kranton and Bramoulle (2007) looks at how a node's position within a network struc-
ture aects its donation behavior to a public good. They show that central actors2
are more likely to free ride in contributing to a public good. There is a large body
of literature within sociology, entitled social network analysis, that evaluates net-
work structure and nodes' characteristics, in terms of network characteristics such
as centrality, density, and brokerage. Freeman (2007) and Granovetter (1974) are
foundational texts in this area. Prell et al. (2009) utilizes social network analysis to
determine what types of actors should be targeted for stakeholder selection. They
nd that choosing central stakeholders with high betweeness3 improves stakeholder
representation, which is a nding that speaks to mechanisms at work in this research.
Namely, I believe that incorporating individuals with high betweeness, as opposed
to high degree centrality, in my social network intervention is a major reason for
why I observe a positive eect of my social network interention. However, given my
limited resources in mapping each village's complete network structure, in addition
1Churning is the formation and breakup of new links.
2Degree centrality is how many others a node is connected to.
3Betweeness, or brokerage is how many times an actor rests between two other nodes. Brokers
are those who can bring together disconnected segments of a network.
3
to the logistical constraints in assigning a unique name to each village member4, my
main focus in this dissertation is to capture the overall impact of the intervention
and not the eect of a node's placement within the network.
The impetus behind identifying the eects of social capital in this setting is to
uncover the reasons for major productivity dierentials between males and females.
Baes (2009) had discovered with a similar sampling of individuals in the Ugandan
cotton growing sector that women's productivity lagged far behind that of men's.
Productivity dierentials across genders have been studied, but primarily with a
focus on the tangible dierences in inputs and ownership across males and females
(Appleton et al., 1999; Quisumbing, 1999; Udry, 1996). Yet, if uid social networks
are a universal input for development, then their absence could be a reason for eco-
nomic stagnation. This research tests that hypothesis.
Both my own and past research has discovered that social networks within
rural Uganda remain topically specialized and segregated across gender. Females
speak to one another about child care, health and family, but hardly about produc-
tion. Males speak to one another about nances, spouses, and land. And there is
little updating across the two, as witnessed by many focus group meetings as well
as the work of Katungi et al. (2006). It was clear in my eld work that even if some
members of a village received new information, there was no guarantee that that
4Individuals in Uganda do not retain a unique last name within their family lineage. In addition,
women are known by one of three names: their own rst and second name, their own rst and
husband's rst name, and their son's name.
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information would diuse to everyone in a village.
I realized that several institutional norms brought about the currently observed
networks in Uganda: (1) Only a handful of locally recognized males frequently re-
ceive training; (2) Trainers have unrealistic expectations that the trainees will train
additional individuals; (3) Women do not discuss production, especially not for the
purposes of cash income; (4) Women and men do not mingle on a daily basis; (5)
There is a stated and stigma-less acceptance that females have less capacity to learn,
retain, and execute information 5.
In this research, I implemented a randomized control trial to test whether so-
cial capital has a causal eect on productivity. I designed a program that paired
individuals to new links and provided them with exchangeable information as an
incentive to learn and interact. The purpose was to observe whether an exogenous
shift in a female's network, in addition to access to new information, would aect
uptake of a new cash crop, as well as change productive outcomes. Working with
females in particular was crucial, as I expected there to be large gains from provid-
ing them with new contacts and information.
By quantifying the latter, I am able to identify a bottleneck in development
programs, as many development programs today are information-based training pro-
5This is something that I was repeatedly told in focus meetings. I say stigma-less because
individuals were open to women demonstrating their potential in a male's domain, and subsequently
respected as an authority, but the norm was that they were guilty of ignorance until they proved
otherwise.
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grams that rely on, and are overlayed onto, existing social networks. Yet, existing
social structures may not be able to transmit the specic information that develop-
ment agents expect them to as those networks developed for the purpose of trans-
mitting other types of information. By developing a social network-based training
program, I encouraged the formation of a new link for the purpose of transmitting
new information, and have simultaneously created an exogenous source of variation
in network formation from which I can identify the eects of social networks.
The next chapter presents a backdrop on gender and agriculture in devel-
opment, and describes where females, and female-headed households, specically,
stand in terms of agricultural production, local institutions, and social norms. A
historical perspective of Uganda and its commodities from pre-to post-colonial rule
outlines the origins of government institutions under which subsistence farmers work
today. The nal section outlines the project design. Chapter 2 analyzes the results
of the experimental games, while chapter 3 analyzes the results of the full social
network program. Chapter 4 concludes.
1.1 Motivation: Gender and Agriculture
Much of the world's growth in land productivity, labor productivity, and real
income has occurred over the past two centuries as agrarian economies transitioned
to industrial economies. The modernization of agriculture has not yet occurred in
developing nations such as Africa and Latin America. In SSA, agriculture comprises
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30% of GDP, and utilizes 70% of the continent's labor force, yet productivity per unit
of land and labor is low (Mangheni, 2007). In Uganda, for example, the agricultural
sectors consist of small holder farmers, cultivating about 2 to 3 acres each, 70% of
which is used to produce locally-consumed crops. This research addresses ways to
improve the productivity of local agrarian systems as the rst step in a transition
to a modern agricultural system and long term economic growth.
If agriculture is the keystone to development, then women are the turnkeys
of agricultural production in SSA. In Uganda, women supply 70-80 % of the agri-
cultural labor force, are responsible for 80 % of food crop production, and provide
50-60 % of labor for cash crop production (J.R.Bibangambah, 1996). As women
provide the bulk of agricultural labor in SSA, their contribution to both local and
national economies is substantial. The food crops that females produce feed their
country's future human capital. Females are thus often single-handedly responsible
for the growth and development of their household's dependents, while their male
counterparts often do not or cannot hedge their wives against adverse income shocks
(Duo, 2010).
While food crops fuel current and future human capital, they rarely are a
sucient source of capital for investments into new tools and inputs. Food crops
rarely generate sucient surplus that could be converted into a meaningful sum of
disposable income. As such, there are barriers to entering the virtuous cycle of
development and reinvestment (Duo, 2010). To enable females the opportunity to
dictate their own growth and investments, it is crucial that they be incorporated
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into more lucrative production chains.
1.1.1 Female-headed Households
In most instances, the chance to cultivate cash crops is unlikely, even if females
have the opportunity to do so. In more traditional male-headed households females
receive the inputs that their husbands allocate to them, which are generally inferior
in quality. Even if they have the opportunity to cultivate cash crops, women do not
manage the cash ow that is generated from selling them.
This research does not delve into the issues of household bargaining and in-
equality that females face within male-headed households in SSA. Rather, it inves-
tigates a possible channel through which the stagnation in female productivity can
be broken. The sample utilized in the thesis comprises of female-headed households,
allowing us to abstract away from some of the consistently cited sources of gender
productivity dierentials, such as land tenure. Namely, female-headed households
are in control of their own resources and resource allocation, and therefore, are not
subject to the insecurity in land ownership that can be at the root of low yields
(Udry, 1996).
Female-headed households are also often deemed more at risk to food insecu-
rity than females who are privy to their spouses' resources. Because they are often
divorced, widowed, or separated, their social context, choices and outcomes will
be atypical for females belonging to male-headed households. Although they may
have acquired their own land, they are nevertheless on the periphery of local social
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settings, and therefore socially and subsequently physically far from the density of
information, information that their married counterparts may be privy to via their
husbands. As such, this population of independent women is an excellent example
of how marginalized groups can improve their outcomes.
1.2 Cotton Production in Uganda-Formal Institutions
This research focuses on one of Uganda's, and Sub Saharan Africa's major
cash crops, cotton. Cotton was introduced to Uganda in 1903 while it was governed
by the British Commonwealth, 1894-1964. Since the early 20th century, cotton has
been one of the key export crops of 30 African countries. In Uganda, it employs more
than 1 million households, where about half of the country's output is produced in
the Northern and Eastern regions.
To understand the context and constraints that cotton farmers face today, it is
important to look at the history and current standing of the country's institutions.
The institutions at the government-level determine the incentives and contracts, or
lack thereof, of ginners and traders, which ultimately aects the production of the
subsistence farmer. From 1903 to 1930, cotton was a government-controlled crop,
which led to the establishment of research and extension services, seed breeding,
quality control, and seed input supplies. But by the 1930s privately owned ginneries
sprang up, mostly owned by families resettled from India (J.R.Bibangambah, 1996).
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To balance large-scale control, co-operative unions were formed in the 1950s
to represent smallholder farmers, to help them maintain ownership of their cotton
and to process the cotton into viable products rather than selling it in its raw form.
But by the time Uganda gained independence in 1964, these co-operative unions
had been subsumed into government boards such as the Cotton Growers Associa-
tion (CGA), which were rst designed by the colonial government. They were later
converted into various other entities: the Lint Marketing Board (LMB), followed by
the current Cotton Development Organization (CDO). The boards were created so
that the state could maintain control over agricultural marketing.
Both the CGA and the LMB dictated lint prices, and controlled the potential
output of cotton through the ginneries which were the sole providers of cotton seed
and sole purchasers of seed cotton. Thus a relationship between ginner and farmer
began with less than ideal incentives for ecient production. Because ginners deter-
mined how much seed would be sold and purchased from farmers' output at a xed
price, there was little incentive to improve upon growing techniques as compared to
one's neighbor. Today, some residual disincentives for eciency remain. Seed is in
fact provided for free, and while prices are not xed, they are foreshadowed by a new
system called indicative prices. Indicative prices are announced prior to the growing
season to allow farmers to predict their potential revenue from cotton, and allocate
their resources across crops appropriately. Unfortunately, the predictive power in
determining the market price is poor and prices are volatile. There are years when




Formalized property rights circumscribed what females could pursue with re-
gards to agriculture, and agricultural extension training has allowed this disparity
to persist. Agricultural extension training services began during colonial times, and
have continued into the present through government funding and international aid in
Uganda. The most prominent agricultural program since 2001, which provides train-
ing services in cotton, is led by Uganda's National Agricultural Advisory Services
(NAADS) that relies on the participatory monitoring and evaluation design (PME).
One of the failings that extension trainers cite in PME is, that it works best when
groups are already organized and empowered. This type of program clearly presents
a vicious circle for growers of new crops (Mangheni, 2007). As a result, NAADS,
like many extension training programs default to training males, whose day- to -day
livelihood is mainly structured around production. Furthermore, the dissemination
of NAADS information depends upon a top down training structure, where the most
able and literate males in a village are trained, often in a classroom-like setting, and
then anticipated to share and propagate their knowledge informally. Males are very
often selected for training because they are more likely to be literate. As a result,
women are a minority in such training, and even if one is present, the female net-
works to which she belongs cannot support or reinforce her training (Mangheni,
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2007). As such, females, and to a greater degree, female-headed households, which
more recently had the opportunity to grow and invest in cash crops, had little for-
mal and informal institutional support in their undertakings. This research will help
us better understand the nature of institutions that are successful in the transfer
of technology to females resulting in higher agricultural productivity for the country.
1.3 Low Productivity and Gender
Uganda reached its peak production of cotton in the 1960s to 1970s, producing
between 200,000 and 300,000 bales 6. Productivity has varied over the 20th century,
mostly because of the political implications of Idi Amin's regime. In the post-colonial
era, Uganda's second independent president, Idi Amin, initiated a campaign against
Ugandans of Indian origin, the primary owners of Uganda's ginneries, driving out
the cotton business. By 1978 output had fallen to 11,000 bales.
Because of this hiatus in cotton growing, cotton growing knowledge skipped
generations within households. And the reintroduction of cotton during President
Museveni's term has not revived production levels back to their previous levels,
particularly in Eastern and Northern Uganda, the regions that have less current po-
litical clout. As a result, output remains low and female cotton growers are among
the weakest producers. Currently, Uganda has 50 ginneries and produces about
6USDA: A bale of cotton weighs about 500 pounds.
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25,000 tons of lint, or 135 thousand bales of cotton annually 7. This is about half
of what it was producing in the 1970s, and a far cry from the 1 million bales that
the CDO claims that the country has the potential to produce (Baes, 2009).
A large portion of where Uganda's cotton production is falling short at the
village level is amongst the women who are currently growing cotton. This is the re-
sult of several engendered agricultural institutions that set the stage for the current
productivity dierentials in cotton across gender (Baes, 2009). The rst of these
is that women lack land tenure rights in male-headed households. While this is not
true for female-headed households, the agricultural practices and norms that domi-
nate females' social networks are largely determined by the females in traditionally
male-headed households. There is little discussion about cash crop production issues
and land maintenance, as few women within male-headed households have the need
to discuss such issues. Therefore, while this research looks at the outcomes of female
heads, their outcomes are very much a product of the norms that persist amongst
all female growers, as they belong rst and foremost to female social networks.
For the majority of females, cash crops have not been a viable production
option since the time when the British rst introduced cash crops to Uganda. This
is because the British were the rst to dene an overarching land tenure system.
Concurrent with the introduction of cotton as a new income source, the British
redened roles and ownership between genders. During pre-colonial times, no over-
7185,000 tons= 1 million bales.
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arching land tenure system existed across Uganda. The British were the rst to
introduce property rights beyond a clan's appraisal. Women had always had only
secondary rights to the land of their spouses, but because this was formalized at the
time that cotton was introduced, there was little to no possibility of involvement in
growing cotton, unless their husband mandated it. As a result, women rarely owned
their own land, and therefore did not have the opportunity to decide to grow a cash
crop. If they assisted their husbands in growing a cash crop, it was that husband
that allocated the inputs and collected to the revenue from that output.
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1.4 Project Overview & Data Collection
This project investigates how informal social networks aect a female's pro-
ductivity, as compared to the eects of formal institutional training programs, and
also investigates how information is transferred among individuals in a network.
The study was instigated by a survey conducted by the World Bank in 2009, which
uncovered a four-fold productivity dierential between male and female cotton grow-
ers (Baes, 2009). Other studies have pointed to inferior inputs and the fact that
women do not own their land and therefore do not invest in their land as a potential
cause of low productivity. However, because the females in our sample are heads of
the household and own their resources, these are not potential causes.
Testing whether gender specic training might close these dierences, was the
rst initiative taken on under the umbrella of a larger project funded by the Gen-
der Action Plan in 2009, initiated by Laoura Maratou (University of Maryland) and
John Baes (World Bank, Economic Prospects Group). The subsequent step, devel-
oped by this research's author, was to investigate the informal institutions, female
social networks, that surround cotton production. That is, beyond land tenure, in-
puts, and formal training programs, my objective is to test whether there is a lack of
information ow, lack of a network around production, or bottlenecks within exist-
ing networks that are contributing to the stark dierences in output across gender.
This portion of the study was supported by Markus Goldstein, and funded by the
Development Economics Group at the World Bank.
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In the preliminary stages, I conducted informal focus meetings with groups of
females in Northern Uganda, Lira District. From these meetings, it became clear
that females knew little about each others' problems and solutions with regards to
growing cotton, and even more generally in terms of food crops. It also became clear
that individual and group interviews did not lend themselves to the most accurate
information. Meetings very often resulted in requests for donations rather than a
receptive discussion about growing issues. I realized, however, that groups did want
to learn new information, and I began to devise a game that might provide real
incentives for learning, and enable me to observe how females learn.
After two trial runs of the game, I conducted the information games in 20
Ugandan villages, randomly chosen from a sample of cotton producing villages in
the North and East of Uganda. These were a subset of villages chosen for the
overall training program, mentioned above. The information games were experi-
mental games to test how females learned information specic to growing cotton in
group settings along networks, and what types of incentives encouraged information
exchange most, competitive or group incentives8. The information games provided
intricate data on the information learned, which were then analyzed in terms of what
types of incentives encouraged greater learning via networks. The games concur-
rently served as training sessions in and of themselves. Namely, during a session of
one information game, each participant was trained in one agricultural information
8Training sheets are in Appendix A.
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point about growing cotton. Such information was taken from traditional extension
agents' training sheets that individuals would otherwise learn in standard training
programs. However, each female was ocially trained in only one of twelve points
(on spacing, weeding, thinning, etc.9), and was obliged to learn all other points from
other participants.
My initial plan, however, was to perturb the existing social networks to enable
statistical identication of network eects, since the information games were not yet
a solution to this. The possibility that emerged was to try and aect a change in net-
works at the village level, and then compare outcomes of individuals across villages.
Specically, I found that unless villages were immediate neighbors, information did
not spread easily between individuals within dierent villages. Therefore, I assume
that an individual's social network in this study is contained within the village in
which he or she is residing. Upon a second return visit in early summer 2009, I was
able to work on my initial idea of encouraging new networks amongst females. No
other research within the social network literature had done this previously, and to
my knowledge only one other study within development economics is carrying out
a similar approach to testing the eects of social networks on repayment of loans in
micro nance (Field et al., 2011).
In this second stage of the project, I randomly paired females who participated
in the above games with one another, based on village location and program status.
9See Appendix A.
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More specically, only some of the females who participated in the games were also
surveyed for this study. These are the female-headed households that were chosen
for the overall training study, some of whom were randomly selected for training,
and all of whom were surveyed by our team. I thus aimed to pair females chosen
for the larger training study with females who only participated in my game. This
incorporated more people in the SNI, even if they were not surveyed, and thus gave
participants more possibilities for developing new links.
Each pair was then encouraged to develop a team, and a viable production
strategy for the year, by identifying weaknesses and ways in which they could aid
one another. They were also strongly encouraged to review and update the infor-
mation that they had learned in the information games throughout the growing
season. The combination of the games sessions and the latter local pairing is what I
refer to as the Social Network Intervention (SNI), or Social Network Program here
on out. I then compare the eects of the randomly assigned SNI training method
to the eects of the traditional Training (TR) program that I was integral part of
developing, managing, and carrying out.
1.5 Dissertation Organization
The next sections delve into each stage of the SNI. This chapter reviews the
information games. The chapter reviews the experimental context on which it was
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based, develops an economic model, and predicts the information that each player
learned over subsequent rounds using maximum likelihood and non-linear estima-
tion. I show, empirically, that females learn more information from their peers
when subjected to competitive (tournament) incentives versus team (group or col-
laborative). Specically, I show that the number of information points learned by
participants under tournament incentives rst order stochastically dominates10 the
number of information points learned by participants under team incentives.
Chapter 3 evaluates the second stage of the research, namely, the combined
eects of the information games that are analyzed in Chapter 2, and the random-
ized mentored pairing, with a dierence and dierence methodology. Within this
chapter, I also investigate through which channel the SNI program aected partic-
ipants: through the learning that occurred in the games, or through the pairing
that occurred in the second stage. On average, the eects of the two programs are
comparable, economically and statistically. Yet the SNI costs a fraction of what the
standard Training program costs. However, the distributional eects suggest that
the SNI intervention serves as a better poverty-alleviating tool than the Training
program. I nd that the impact of the SNI exhibits diminishing returns, with the
greatest average eects are for low-to mid-yielding farmers. In contrast, I show that
the standard agricultural training program benets already high-yielding farmers.
Much of the eects of the SNI program appear to be generated by the learning,
10First order stochastic domination (FOSD) of a random variable over another random variable
implies that the CDF of the rst variable lies below that of another.
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and not only the pairing of individuals, though the learning would likely not have
occurred without the mentored pairing. Even after controlling for attendance at the
information games, the coecient on the SNI program remains signicant.
Chapter 4 concludes by evaluating this work on three fronts: overcoming the
empirical challenge of identifying network eorts, using local networks to overcome
constraints and current limitations of extension training, and how policy can pro-
ceed with regards to equalizing production across genders by changing males' as well
as females' incentives for agricultural change.
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Chapter 2
Incentives for Information Exchange: Getting Women to
Share
2.1 Abstract
I use results from experimental games played amongst rural female farmers in
Uganda, participating in agricultural training, to understand how and why dier-
ent types of incentives encourage information exchange amongst females adopting
new technologies. The information game devised for this study was meant to serve
as a blueprint for networking that its female participants could then replicate as
an everyday model for disseminating information. Each participant was trained in
one aspect of growing cotton and encouraged to exchange and mentor other partic-
ipants in order to accumulate a full set of information points. That is, participants
specialized in one aspect of the cotton production process before exchanging their
expertise. Several rounds of networking under dierent incentives schemes reveal
the types of incentives, in particular, team vs. tournament, that are most eective
at encouraging females to network with other females regarding cotton production,
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a new technology in these areas.
I nd that the distribution of total information points learned under tour-
nament incentives rst order stochastically dominates (FOSDs) the distribution of
total information points learned under team incentives. However, the probability
that any particular information point is learned under team incentives is greater than
under tournament incentives. These results hold even after controlling for players'
eort and rst-order network size. They have important implications for improving
the ecacy of training programs in development, which rely on trickle-down meth-
ods of to disseminate information. The incentive structure, which specialized each
participant in one aspect of growing cotton, can also serve as an eective paradigm
for distributing information in other training programs.
2.2 Introduction
Extension workers in many developing country settings are often challenged
by the fact that few individuals who are trained in agriculture successfully imple-
ment new growing techniques or teach and encourage the untrained to do so as well
(Evenson, 1980). Although learning through social networks can have large impacts
on agricultural outcomes (Conley and Udry, 2010), social networks do not always
facilitate spill-over eects from development programs (Duo et al., 2006). These
types of economic and behavioral failures put methods of extension training into
question, can result in wasted resources, and can prolong a path out of poverty.
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One of the main reasons for studying social networks in the development eco-
nomics literature is to better understand learning and adoption processes in rural
areas. Traditional markets for new technologies are often absent in such areas be-
cause of low population density or low literacy rates. Activating social ties may be
a way to alleviate such constraints. Qualifying the incentives behind such learning
is the objective of this study, with a focus on the less-studied networks of female
producers.
Extension trainers use many types of informal incentives for motivating trainees,
where the subtleties of their eects may not be considered. For instance, in this
study's context of cotton farmers in Uganda, extension trainers are often employees
of local ginneries who reward with seeds or appoint to village boards the farmer(s)
with the highest yields in the previous seasons, regardless of the heterogeneity in
agricultural or nancial shocks to farmers. The latter can be seen as a tournament
incentive, where there is a xed amount of seed, and the relatively most successful
producers are rewarded. The same extensionists also provide team incentives by
revisiting or working with the most productive villages. What are the repercussions
of such incentive schemes, and the order in which they are introduced? And how do
they facilitate extension trainers' foremost objective of expanding farmers' knowl-
edge base and improving production outcomes?
The impetus for the following game stems from evidence gathered during the
baseline study for an agricultural training program in Uganda funded by the World
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Bank in January to March of 2009. Data show that women are less networked
amongst themselves as compared to men, where men's networks are 70% male, and
females' are 50% female, even though females share more in common (in terms of
production and time inputs) than with other male growers. Female growers are
also less likely to be connected to reported key information leaders in their village,
who are generally male. Therefore, if substantial resources are to be expended on
training women to grow a relatively new cash crop, and networking and information
sharing is a primary reason behind the benets accrued from many development
programs, then it is imperative that the right type of incentives are implemented to
encourage the desired type of information exchange.
The following game was conducted in 20 villages in Eastern and Northern
Uganda, with groups of 14 women in each village, some of whom participated in our
baseline and social network surveys. The game served as a tool for the social net-
working intervention (SNI), in which farmers were encouraged to establish one new
link and share information on growing cotton acquired from training or otherwise,
but also as an experimental game whose results would reveal what type of economic
incentives encourage dierent types of information exchange.
Two types of incentives were awarded to women for accumulating agricultural
information on growing cotton through assigned game networks, which they were
taught at the start of the game: a tournament incentive and minimum-team in-
centive. The game was designed to realistically mimic information sharing among
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women. Contextually foreign games, such as mazes or board games, were avoided.
I also avoided incentive schemes that would be dicult to implement in reality,
such as piece rate schemes. With the help of the local agronomists conducting the
training interventions, I identied the major points that these trainers would be pre-
senting in their standard training. However, it was how I taught and disseminated
the information that diered from the standard Training program.
2.3 Experimental Literature
The suitable provision of incentives is a theme that rst emerged in the labor
economics literature in the context of encouraging eort towards rm production.
Lazear and Rosen (1981) rst analyzed the rank-order payment scheme, or tour-
nament incentive that had been prevalent in so many labor contracts until then,
but not explicitly modeled. It argued that rewarding risk-averse workers based on
their relative position to others is less costly than observing and rewarding workers
based on their marginal products. Since then, the literature on designing incentives
for workers' eort has grown well beyond labor economics, and developed into its
own niche within experimental economics. Comparisons of tournament and piece
rate incentives continue into the present literature (Bull et al., 1995; Marinakis and
Tsoulouhas, 2006). Some of the studies took to viewing the worker as a part of a
team that collectively produces a rm's output, rather than as an individual who
is competing against her fellow colleagues (Carpenter et al., 2009). More variations
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on the tournament scheme emerged: inter team vs. intra team competition (Fatas
and Neugebauer, 2005) and means to reward the incentive scheme itself: exogenous
vs. endogenous reward payments. Many other questions, though peripheral to this
study, surrounded optimal incentive structures, such as behavioral perversities re-
sulting from oering incentives at all. Benabou and Tirole (2006) nd that eort
is not monotonically increasing in incentives, where there are decreasing returns to
the prize size awarded, while Gneezy et al. (2003) show that preference over prizes
can change with the prevailing institutional incentive.
The issue of team incentives continued to grow inside the experimental lit-
erature, particularly with regards to public goods contributions (Groves, 1973), or
encouraging teams to better contribute towards a common good as a team (Bar-
ton Hamilton and Owan, 2003; Orrison et al., 2004). Team incentives generally take
the form of a communally-generated pie that is distributed amongst the team. Team
members are awarded a xed fraction of the teams' collective product, or a portion
contingent on their eort level or contribution.
A comparison of outcomes under tournament and team incentive schemes fol-
lowed, where eort varied from serving as an input into own utility or a team goal.
In a team goal scenario, free riding is a natural concern: where reducing eort is
benecial to one's own utility, and compromises the team outcome. That is, even in
team goal or public good scenarios, tournament structures can reveal themselves as
the more eective mechanism in inducing worker eort (Irlenbusch and Rucahala,
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2008; Sutter, 2006).
The strength of this nding, however, is questionable when we consider in-
centives schemes according to gender. Both eld and lab experiments reveal that
women are not only more likely to contribute in teams or groups to public goods,
but that they are less successful than men under competitive incentive structures
(Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Ivanova-Stenzel and Kubler
(2005) show that women perform sub-optimally to men when playing in competitive
structures on mixed gender teams.
In the context of the game proposed here, I am inclined to view participants as
members of a team who are contributing to a common pool of knowledge. Che and
Yoo (2001) show that whether we choose to a view a group of workers as individuals
who are in competition with one another, or as a team, depends on the mutual ac-
countability between individuals and the life span of their organization. Taking this
into consideration, village members share a long lasting and binding commitment
that lends itself to my participants viewing themselves as a team. Furthermore, I
consider individuals' exertion of eort as contribution to a common or public good,
here an information pool. Both Romer (1990) and Kranton and Bramoulle (2007)
are examples in which information is treated as a public good.
Ultimately, we have no prior knowledge of the type of incentive scheme that
is actually optimal for females, particularly in a village setting, despite the former
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observations. Predicting which incentive is likely to induce greater eort and ulti-
mately more learning is confounded by a number of opposing forces. On the one
hand, tournaments are historically more eective at encouraging eort, but when
eort is directed towards an intangible public good like information, other strategic
motives may make it optimal to lie or withhold information in a tournament set-
ting. Furthermore, there is evidence that women are less motivated by competitive
incentive schemes than men (Gneezy et al., 2003), potentially less likely to compete
in patriarchal environments such as the ones I am studying (Gneezy et al., 2009),
traditionally more inclined to contribute to public goods, especially in a rural devel-
oping country context (Greig and Bohnetb, 2009; Kilavuka, 2003; Morduch, 1999),
and are inherently more pro-social than men (Skoe et al., 2002) according to social
psychologists. With these ndings, I am inclined to believe that women are possibly
more inequity-averse than men, and might expect them to prefer a more egalitarian
payment scheme (Teyssier, 2007). Can social norms amongst village women trump
the eects of competitive incentives? (Fehr et al., 1998).
2.4 Model
I adapt a model from Irlenbusch and Rucahala (2008) to demonstrate my
incentive scheme succinctly. The min-team incentive is characterized as follows. yi
is production, or the number information points that a participant i learns. It is
determined by i's eort, ei, a continuous variable, and a stochastic component, εi,
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such that yi = ei + εi, where εi is uniformly distributed within an upper and lower
bound ∼ U [−ε̄,+ε̄]. An individual's objective is to choose eort with the objective
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Notice that this team incentive depends on the probability that each player achieves
at least a known k̄, and that there is no benet to contributing eort beyond that
minimum (unlike Reichmann and Weimann (2008)).
Similarly, the objective in the tournament incentive is also to maximize eort
















For the purpose of comparing eort levels, let us assume that E(P TE) =
1
N
E(P TO), where N=14, ei ∈ (0, 12), because an individual can learn between one
and twelve points, and ε̄ ∈ (1, 11), because the number of points learned may ran-
domly vary by an addition one to eleven points. Tournament incentives will induce
greater learning than team incentives if c
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will clearly occur if
eTE∗i < 0.6ε̄+ k̄ (2.5)
since team eort, without the second term, is 1
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th that of tournament eort.
However, if
eTE∗i > 0.6ε̄+ k̄ (2.6)
then team incentives could trump tournament incentives.
In order to derive a closed form solution, I suppose N=2. Taking the ratio of
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This indicates that when players' expected level of uncertainty in learning via
networks takes on larger positive values, optimal team eort is decreasing relative
to optimal tournament eort, since the numerator is then negative and the denom-
inator is positive. For negative values of ε̄, there is a range in which optimal team
eort is increasing relative to tournament incentives.
2.5 Game Description
Players: Fourteen female-headed and non-female-headed household partici-
pants.
Player ID: Each individual receives a number between 1 and 14 signifying
her identity (rather than by name, to disassociate people from existing ties).
Random Network Assignment: Participants' numbers are then randomly
assigned some size network between 1 and 4 individuals. For example, if person 1
is randomly assigned to 3 links, then 3 unique numbers from a uniform distribution
between 1 and 14 are selected.
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The random assignment of a network is not binding. Once a woman talks to
her assigned network, she's allowed to branch out to others. This serves two similar
purposes: To help those who are less networked or less adept at networking to begin
participating in the game, and to serve as a possible instrument for a person's true
network size, taken from the social network survey2.
Three rounds: Each round has a dierent incentive for learning new infor-
mation from other players. Round 1 oers no prize. It serves as a round from
which I can derive a measure of eort (and learning speed) for each individual, to
be discussed in Section 2.7. Round 2 gives out one prize for the most collected
information. Round 3 gives out a group prize if all individuals acquire a minimum
specied number of information points about cotton growing that was decimated
during the game. In each round I see how the dierent incentives encourage indi-
viduals to pass out information. I quantify the speed of interaction by tracking one
unique point of information given out in each round.
Treatments: The following treatments are introduced to participants in the
order of treatment one, followed by treatment two or three, where the latter two
treatments are introduced in a random order to account for order eects, when eval-
uating outcomes after round one. Each round is timed to last 12 minutes.
2About half of the women in each experiment are those who are surveyed the day before this
game is played.
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Treatment one (No Prize): The unique pieces of information are concerned
with cotton growing. Players are told to learn the information known in their as-
signed networks, and to teach their information point in return. By gathering how
much of the information they correctly learned from their assigned network, con-
trolling for network size, I can estimate a measure of learning eort.
Treatment two (One Grand Prize): Now individuals play for one grand
prize that only one individual can claim. The woman acquiring the most informa-
tion points is rewarded at the end of all rounds.
Round three (Group Prize): Now individuals play for a group prize. If
every individual of the 14 women acquires at least 5 points, then the entire group
receives a prize.3
(Prizes): Because I am not interested in the the eects of the stakes on be-
havior, and because both the structure and level of prizes aect behavior (Ehrenberg
and Bognanno, 1990), prizes and winners are left unknown across treatments. The
2010 survey did survey participants, expost, on what they believed the prizes to
be worth. The results are summarized in 2.1. For most game participants, their
expectations of the prize value corresponded to the actual cost of the prize, which
was in the range of 2.50-5.00 US dollars. Expectations for the group prize had a
3Note that the game was conducted in the above order as well as with the order of round two
and three reversed, to enable us to ensure that the incentive itself, and not the order in which the
incentives are presented, is what drives learning.
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greater variance, with the highest frequency of expectations on 10 and 100 USD,
where the group prize was worth 10 USD. A piece rate incentive was not considered,
because measuring output of all training participants by extension trainers would
be realistically unfeasible on a national scale.
2.5.1 Game Instructions
Every individual is taught one piece of information in condentiality from thir-
teen information points concerning cotton growing, which were identied as knowl-
edge that most farmers (in the East and North of Uganda) lack.
An individual is required to rst speak with the individuals randomly assigned
to them, and then, only after speaking with these two individuals can they continue
to seek to develop new links (this is to ensure that there is at least some random
element to the size of one's network that is not a function of person specic char-
acteristics). The participants return at the end of each round to privately recount
what they learned.
2.6 Results
Result 1) Women learn more under tournament incentives than under team
incentives. The distribution of total information points learned under tournament
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incentives rst order stochastically dominates (FOSDs) the distribution of total in-
formation points learned under team incentives. FOSD indicates that the learning
distribution under tournament incentives is uniformly below the learning distribu-
tion under team incentives, i.e. higher values are realized with greater probability
under tournament incentives. Thus, while FOSD implies that the mean number of
points must be higher under tournament, it also means that there is a higher prob-
ability of learning more points across the entire distribution of total points learned.
A non-parametric Wilcoxin matched-pairs signed-ranks comparing the median
number of points learned between treatments, pooling over the order in which treat-
ments were received, conrms that the median frequency in learning signicantly
diers between the two treatments (p=0.0001). Although there may be dierential
learning eects, dependent on the order in which incentives were introduced (partic-
ularly in terms of learning how to play the game optimally), these incentives should
cancel each other in the pooled data-set. Figure 2.1 plots the total number of points
learned in a game, pooling the results across dierent treatment orders. I nd that
the distribution of total information learned under tournament incentives FOSDs
the total information learned under team incentives.
Result 2) The probability that a unique information point is learned under
team incentives is higher than under tournament incentives.
A non-parametric Wilcoxin matched-pairs signed-ranks conrms that the higher
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percentage of participants learning the unique point under team incentives, 68%, vs.
the percentage of participants learning the unique point under tournament incen-
tives, 50%, are signicantly dierent, with a p-value close to zero.
Result 3) Playing the game under tournament incentives before team incen-
tives results in better learning how to learn the unique information point. That
is, all else equal, we should not expect a statistically signicant dierence in the
cumulative number of points learned across treatments depending on the order in
which those treatments were introduced.
Table 2.2 shows that there is no statistical dierence between the amount of
information learned depending on the order of the incentives, but that there is a
signicant dierence in whether an individual learned the unique information point
in round 3, depending on the order of incentives, namely 75% chance of learning the
unique point in round 3 if the individual received the tournament incentive rst.
However, when I test for whether the total number of points learned by round 3
is statistically dierent depending on the order in which the incentives were received
in a regression framework that controls for rst round eort, order is signicant.
Table 2.3 shows that the coecient on order is negative, where order=1 if team
was received before tournament. This conrms that the tournament-team incentive
ordering increases the total information learned by round 3.
These results suggest that the order in which incentives are introduced does
not have a signicant impact on overall learning, but does have a signicant impact
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on learning a particular information point. This may be because in the tournament
game, players can observe who are the outstanding performers, and, as a result,
when I repeated the game with team incentives the outstanding players are singled
out as good transmitters of the unique information point, thus aecting the outcome
based on what was observed in the previous round with tournament incentives.
2.7 Estimation of Game Incentives' Eects
In order to investigate the eects of team versus tournament incentives, while
controlling for eort and ability, I estimate a generalized Poisson model4. I assume
that the stochastic shocks to production, or learning, ε, take on only positive values
from the support of the Uniform distribution on which it is dened: ε ∈ (0, ε+). That
is, I assume that the stochastic shocks only take on positive values for individuals,
given that the prize should have a positive incentive on eort, and I do not assume
any loss aversion by the ith player in the tournament game should the jth player
win. Therefore, I expect tournament incentives to have relatively stronger eects
on total learning than team incentives, given my models' predictions. I estimate:
Ptsi2 = α + β ∗ orderi2 + δ ∗ ei1 + η ∗ sizei + ei2 (2.9)
where Pts is the number of points learned by the end of round 2, or-
der equals one if a group received the team (round2) followed by the tournament
4This enables us to account for over-or under-dispersion in the learning outcome variable.
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(round3) incentive, e is individual i's eort and ability to acquired information,
measured as the total number of points the individual learned from her assigned
partners in round 1, and size is the number of individuals the player was in-
structed to talk to in round 1. Here I look at the number of points learned by the
end of round 2, since it captures the pure eects of tournament vs. team incentives,
whereas round 3 totals represent a cumulative eect of incentives.
The eort variable is an approximate measure for an individual's eort to learn
within the connes of the game rules, where players were only instructed to learn
from their assigned network in round 1. I also control for the number of individuals
a player is assigned to, as the size of network varied between 1 and 4 links. After
round 1, they were encouraged to talk to others outside their assigned network, once
they had completed speaking to the former.
My results in Table 2.3 from estimating a generalized Poisson model in col-
umn(1) indicate that tournament incentives are signicantly more eective at en-
couraging overall learning, even after controlling for eort and network size. Total
2 is the total number of points learned by the end of round 2, and order is equal
to 1 if the individual received a team incentive in round 2, and 0 if she received a
tournament incentive in round 2.
The estimation results from a Probit with Learn 2 as the dependent variable
are inconclusive at determining which incentive results in a greater number of indi-
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viduals learning the unique point.
Round 3 estimations conform to my plots showing that tournament followed by
team incentives results in players learning how to learn in the game (where Order=0
if tournament (round 2) is followed by team (round 3) incentives) after controlling
for eort and network size.
Finally, because team incentives were introduced with a minimum number of
points to be learned in order for the group to receive a prize, there may be no individ-
ual incentive to exceed that minimum. Therefore, to make a more fair comparison
across tournament and team incentives, I estimate the eects of the treatments on
the learning outcome less the minimum required under team incentives (3 point
minimum). These results are presented in column (5) above. It indicates that tour-
nament incentives remain more eective in explaining the variance in the number
of points learned beyond three.
2.8 Discussion
These results inform us that tournament incentivesdespite behavioral evi-
dence that females are more pro-social and public good oriented than men, as well
as the complication that a competitive incentive structure might lead to strate-
gic disincentives for sharingstill induce the greatest information dispersion among
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women in female networks, even after controlling for their initial eort and ability.
Therefore, it is unlikely that mechanisms like inequity aversion are at play. However,
there is some evidence that team incentives are more eective at disseminating any
one particular information point as the probability of Learn2 is higher under team
than tournament incentives. This is a useful nding in that extension trainers may
want farmers to amass and retain as much information as possible, but, should also
encourage them to learn specic points from one another that trainers and most
growers might be unaware of.
Finally, the order in which incentives are introduced matters for how well a par-
ticipant learns to play the game. All else equal, I should expect the same amount of
total information to be learned regardless of the order in which incentives are intro-
duced. On the contrary, introducing tournament incentives prior to team incentives
leads to more information learning, suggesting that that this ordering of incentives
leads to more ecient playing strategies. This ordering of incentives runs counter to
the order in which extension agents seem to naturally introduce incentives5, which
may create barriers to adopting a new technology if the same villages are given an
advantage in training from year to year.
5Namely, they choose a village to work in rst (team incentive), and reward the best workers
with seeds (tournament incentive) in subsequent years.
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2.8.1 Further Work
I would rst like to expand my empirical estimation to test for whether the
initial network structure6 that I imposed on participants can help explain why tour-
nament incentives are stronger at impacting overall learning, yet team incentives en-
courage dissemination of learning particular information. Preliminary results show
that network structure has an impact on learning, though the size of one's network
does not. For instance, predicting whether a unique point is learned, with and
without pooling over treatments, on size of network yields insignicant size eects.
However, the structure of one's network, i.e. the distance to an information point
from which a player is situated from within her assigned network, has a signicantly
negative eect, on whether the point was learned.
For a subset of the participants in my information games, I have detailed infor-
mation on participants' actual networks as well as baseline data on their production
and demographics. I would like to look at how participants' actual networks, both
in size and quality7 relate to outcomes in the information games, as well as how
participants' performance in the game relates to their production outcomes.
Finally, I also would like to learn more about the type of information being
disseminated. Because I recorded exactly what information points were learned by
participants, I can look at whether a wider variety of information points are learned
6Recall, that each individual received a network between 1 and 4 individuals at random.
7Quality of the network is measured as the number of well-connected individuals in a farmer's
network, where well-connected individuals are all those farmers deemed knowledgeable by sur-
veyees.
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under team incentives relative to tournament, as well as when there are more errors
in reporting information learned, data which were also recorded.
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2.9 Figures and Tables
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Figure 2.1: Total Agricultural Information Learned, Pooled over Treatment Order
44
Table 2.1: Expectations for Tournament versus Team Prize Values (UG Shs)
Mean Std Dev Min Max
Tournament 156,718 173,886 1,000 100,000
Team 35,170 68,563 1 500,000
Table 2.2: Dierences in Information Learned Over Rounds
Mean(Tour-Team) Mean(Team-Tour) Wilcoxon(p-value) Ksmirnov(p-value)
Total3 6.65 6.41 0.21 0.94
Rnd 3
Learn3 0.75 0.45 0 0
Table 2.3: The Eects of Eort and Incentives on Learning
Total2 Learn2 Total3 Learn3 Total2Less5
Rnd 2 Rnd 2 Rnd 3 Rnd 3 Rnd 2(Less Min Pts)




Eort .078*** 0.0007 0.0711*** 0.195* 0.131**
(Rnd 1 Pts) (2.46) (0.01) (2.615) (1.741) (2.12)
Size Network -0.015 0.058 -0.0154 -0.0446 -0.039
(-0.71) (0.93) (-1.025) (-0.527) (-0.67)
Constant 1.50*** -0.06 1.870*** 0.635* 0.71***
(29.03) (-0.31) (34.42) (1.840) (5.60)
Observations 263 263 263 263 229
Dispersion 0.630 . 0.591 .
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 3
As Good as the Networks We Keep?
Expanding Social Networks via Randomized Information
Exchange
3.1 Abstract
This research isolates the impact of female social networks for subsistence
farmers in rural Uganda for a re-emerging cash crop. I devised a social networking
intervention (SNI), randomized at the village level, to tease out the pure eects of
females' social networking on both females' and males' agricultural outcomes. The
objective was to exogenously engineer social links by strategically placing new agri-
cultural information (and provide training on this information point) with individ-
uals embedded in pre-existing female social networks. Participants were encouraged
to share, teach, and verify information over time with a randomly assigned partner.
This would instigate their achieving a full knowledge set via newly created weak
links.
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Dierence in dierence estimates of the treatment eects show that the ex-
pansion of females' social networks signicantly increases productivity for farmers
producing at the average yield of production, up to four times the average house-
hold's annual yield for cotton. The impact of the SNI exhibits diminishing returns
for the highest yielding quantile of producers, suggesting that learning between
farmers is most productive for low- and mid-yielding producers. In contrast, the
standard agricultural training program benets already high-yielding farmers. The
SNI intervention has its strongest impact on females' production, but also spills over
to males' yields, increasing overall welfare of the village. I nd that the average ef-
fects of the two programs are comparable, but they lead to dierent marginal eects
along the distribution of producers. The SNI benets the lowest-yielding producers
most, while the Training program benets the highest-yielding producers most.
From a policy perspective, these ndings are substantial. In many developing
countries, women supply the majority of agricultural labor, exhibit substantially
lower yields compared to their male counterparts; however, due to cultural norms,
women are rarely the recipients of training programs, particularly those that gener-
ate their own cash ow. A simple expansion of females' networks to promote new
technologies is a not-yet utilized, but clearly eective tool for helping the poorest
farmers.
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3.2 Introduction to Social Networks
In the last few decades, the focus of economic growth in developing countries
has shifted from country-wide prescriptions to testable micro-development programs
at the local level. Agricultural growth, in particular, is seen as the building block
for alleviating hunger and poverty, as agriculture is the primary source of livelihood
in the rural developing world. Programs aimed at increasing agricultural produc-
tivity are regarded as the most powerful means to reducing poverty as compared
to nonagricultural programs (Asfaw et al., 2011; Thirtle et al., 2001). An essen-
tial stage in any program intended to increase productivity is the dissemination
of new techniques and technologies by agricultural extension agents and trainers.
This stage is frequently one of the weakest links in the process. One of the reasons
for the lack of clear success in this eort is that trainers' success in reaching and
aecting all individuals in a particular location relies on the eectiveness of social
networks, which are often unknown to an outsider and dicult to identify. While
extension agents may bring new technologies with each program, what works best
in practice in a remote village can widely dier from what is taught or what outside
trainers perceive as being important for local production. It is through individu-
als' personal ties that external information is disseminated within a remote area,
tested and localized, ultimately creating usable and believable knowledge. Thus,
many welfare-improving technologies are never adopted because individuals are not
connected to eective social networks.
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Understanding the impact of social networks on individuals' outcomes is, thus,
central to development at the microeconomic level. Identifying these impacts, how-
ever, suers from serious problems and it is dicult to prove that such impacts even
exist and to what degree they impede or assist progress. There is no shortage of
evidence that individuals with strong links to social networks, large social networks
or almost any measure of social connectedness are more likely to adopt and experi-
ence better outcomes. However, social connectedness is endogenous and therefore I
cannot isolate the impact of social networks on decision making for the reason that
dynamic individuals belong to social networks. Unobservable characteristics of an
individual, such as networking ability and sociability, which aect an individual's
productive outcomes, are correlated with the type of network that an individual
forms, confounding the impact of network eects, and biasing the estimated impact
of social network measures.
This paper examines a research project that measured the impact of social
networks for subsistence farmers in rural Uganda. To deal directly with the identi-
cation problem I implemented a social networking intervention (SNI), randomized
at the village level, to tease out the pure eects of females' social networking on
both females' and males' agricultural outcomes. The SNI exogenously increased the
size of the average woman's social network in treatment villages and left existing
networks intact in control villages. I show that the treatment increases productivity
for farmers producing at the average yield of production, and up to four times the
average household's annual yield for cotton. The intervention has its strongest im-
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pact on females' production, but also spills over to males' yields, increasing overall
yields in the village.
By using an intervention to exogenously increase the size of networks, I am
avoiding many of the problems faced in the literature on social networks and am able
to measure the value, on the margin, of adding to network size for the average female
farmer. Thus, I avoid the type of network endogeneity that occurs when measures of
the social network are dened using descriptive statistics of the networks' outcomes:
the size of the network, the average age and work experience of the network, and
the education level of the network. All of these characteristics of an individual's
network reect her ability to connect with such individuals, which would likely be
correlated with her productive outcomes. Another common way to measure an in-
dividual's network is by summarizing the average outcomes of the individuals in the
network: e.g. the number of individuals who decide to adopt a new technology, or
the percentage of contacts who choose one input amount over another. These mea-
sures suer from endogeneity issues known as the reection problem. The reection
problem refers to the idea that an individual's outcome may seem to be aected
by his or her network only because her network faces the same unobservable shocks
or inuences that simultaneously inuence the individual, and not because the in-
dividual is in fact mimicking her network's actions (Manski, 1993). More complex
graph-based measures of networks-including cohesion1 or reach of the network2-lead
1Cohesion refers to the minimum number of nodes that would need to be removed to disconnect
a group.
2Reach refers to the number of nodes within X number of steps from an individual.
50
to better understandings of social networks, but do not deal with the endogeneity
problem.
This is one of two research studies, to my knowledge, on social networks in
the development literature that uses a randomized encouragement design aimed at
exogenously changing the social networks of women. Field et al. (2011) is another
current study that exogenously perturbs new micronance groups in Bangladeshi
villages by varying the meeting frequency of these groups to understand the impact
of network eects on loan repayment. Other research, such as Leonard (2007) and
Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002) use natural exogenous variation to identify network
eects. Leonard (2007) uses the sudden and exogenous replacement of clinicians in
local health facilities to identify health care quality's eect on patient's learning
about health care via their social network. Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002) uses the
exogenous placement of college freshman's to identify the eects of social networks
on future labor outcomes. I am interested in determining whether social networks
are a means to improve female's production of a relatively new crop, and to estimate
social network (SN) eects without statistical bias. Randomization of a social net-
work intervention (SNI) at the village level allows us to test both these hypotheses.
By comparing outcomes of farmers assigned to the SNI to farmers in a control group,
over time, I can estimate the impact of expanding a female's network. The estimated
network eects will not be diluted by potential spillovers of the SNI, because indi-
viduals in the treated and control groups are in separate villages. Furthermore,
the SNI was implemented in the presence of a randomly assigned cotton-training
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program, denoted as TR, which enables us to distinguish between the pure eect of
social networks on productive outcomes, and the additive eect of social networks
when coupled with a training program.
The decision to structure the SNI around females was inspired by an earlier
study in rural Uganda on cotton producers that revealed male-heads' of households
yields to be 3-4 times that of female-heads' of households yields (Baes, 2008).
This is a tremendous welfare loss and reects the general phenomena in developing
countries of females operating far below their full potential, while males continue
to receive training (Chambers, 1993). As females supply 70-80% of agricultural la-
bor in rural Uganda and are responsible for 80% of food crop production (Tanzarn,
2005), this is also a tremendous loss to national welfare. Other studies have looked
at possible reasons for these productivity dierentials (Quisumbing, 2003; Udry,
1996). They have tested the impact of lower quality inputs, time constraints, dis-
parate production functions, and property rights, where ownership of one's property
seemed to be a signicant explanation for gender dierentials in productivity3. No
study has yet looked at whether under-utilization of females' social networks could
be behind this production schism.
Cotton production is particularly interesting to these purposes because it is
being re-introduced in Uganda for the rst time since the 1970's. Due to civil war
3Women are unable to allow their land to lie fallow for fear of losing control of their plot (Udry
and Goldstein, 2006).
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and political unrest, cotton production ceased under Idi Amin's regime when the
majority of the Indians who managed Uganda's businesses were persecuted and ex-
pelled. As a result, at least one generation passed in which no transfer of knowledge
occurred for many of the cash producing crops. Udry's seminal work shows that it
is precisely in these circumstances, where new technologies are nascent, that social
networks should have their greatest impacts (Conley and Udry, 2010).
3.3 Social Networks and Technology Adoption
In development economics, there are two groups of studies on social networks
that focus on estimating the impact of social networks on technology adoption and
learning, in terms of correct input use and resource allocation. The rst group
studies the eect of individuals' existing social capital (ego network) on the decision
to adopt new technologies (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Isham, 2002; Maertens, 2010;
Matuschke and Qaim, 2009; Young, 2009). The second group looks at the eect of
individuals' social capital on input use, testing whether learning occurs inside the
network (Conley and Udry, 2010; Darr and Pretzsch, 2008; Goldstein and Udry,
1999; Kremer et al., 2009; Munshi, 2004).
The above literature employs dierent methodologies to deal with the endo-
geneity of social networks. The adoption-network literature attempts to identify
network eects by controlling for a gamut of individual level characteristics that
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may confound individuals' network eects, in the hope that these variables will
control for all unobservable characteristics of the individual. Matuschke and Qaim
(2009) nd that the endogenous group network measures, such as the average num-
ber of adopters in an individual's network, impact an individual's decision to adopt
a new crop. Bandiera and Rasul (2006) also use endogenous network measures, i.e.
the number of sunower plant adopters in an individual's network, to predict an
individual's decision to adopt. They too nd that endogenous network measures
signicantly inuence an individual's outcomes. Specically, they nd that the rela-
tionship between the probability that an individual adopts sunower production and
the number of adopters in that individual's network is inverse-U shaped. In other
words, the probability of an individual's adopting sunower production increases
with the number of adopters in their networks at a decreasing rate, and eventually
declines with the number of adopters. Unlike the former two studies, Isham (2002)
identies the eects of networks using the exogenous variation in an individual's
networks caused by ethnic fractionalization and land inequality. He nds that so-
cial capital, when instrumented for, using tribal aliations, has signicant impacts
on adoption decisions. However, there are many other aspects of an individual's
production network that are not captured by ethnic aliation, which a researcher
would want to identify.
The learning-network literature relies on dynamic decision making to capture
network eects. Namely, the individual only makes decisions after observing the
actions of his network's members. If all actions and decisions are captured sequen-
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tially, and we believe that the actions of one individual are caused by observing the
outcomes of others', then information x at time t for person j, should identify the
decision or outcomes of individual i at time t + 1. With detailed data on the out-
comes and order of outcomes for all individuals in a network, this literature argues
that the reection problem is bypassed. Conley and Udry (2010) and Goldstein and
Udry (1999) rely on the dynamic decision making assumption to identify learning
from one's network, as well as detailed information on geography, soil, credit and
family relationships that should control for confounding productivity factors. They
nd strong evidence of social learning, where farmers' decisions on inputs are af-
fected by the successful outcomes of their neighbors in previous periods. Munshi
(2004) adds to this result by showing that more learning occurs in more homogenous
populations. Maertens (2010) also uses a similar dynamic decision making method-
ology as Conley and Udry (2010), but for predicting adoption decisions rather than
inputs or outputs. Her research goes further and looks at distinguishing the channels
by which individuals decide to adopt: social learning, imitation or social pressures,
which are similarly outlined in Young (2009). Leonard (2007) looks at the decision
to visit a health care facility with new clinicians as similar to the decision to adopt a
new technology and uses a methodology similar to that of Conley and Udry (2010)
by assuming individuals can only learn from the experience of people who visited
the facility before they became sick. These methodologies rely on meticulous data
collection and the belief that the available observable control variables, such as soil
characteristics, are sucient for dealing with confounding unobservable variables,
such as weather and other productivity shocks, which concurrently aect the indi-
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vidual and their network.
Duo et al. (2006) is one study that uses an experimental design to iden-
tify social networks' eects. In Duo et al. (2006), farmers are randomly selected
from among the parents of children on school lists to participate in fertilizer-use
trials. They compare the average outcomes of those individuals who were reported
speaking to selected farmers with the average outcomes of individuals who were
reported speaking to the control group. Essentially, they are exogenously altering
the information present in some randomly selected social networks. According to
their randomization, their identication strategy relies on the fact that there are
no signicant spill-over eects of the information from the networks of trained in-
dividuals to the networks of untrained individuals. Namely, they state, farmers
participating in each pilot were randomly selected from the parents of a school list,
and that participating in the trials is randomly assigned within a school. Parents
from the same schools that were not selected form a control group(Duo et al.,
2006). However, when interventions are likely to have signicant externalities, ran-
domization across individuals will not capture the full eect of a program. That
is, if the networks of trained and untrained are in close enough proximity to each
other, it is very likely that individuals who spoke to trained farmers could have then
shared the information with individuals in the network of untrained farmers. As a
result, the dierences in average outcomes of untrained and trained networks will
not be detectable, which is what the authors nd, when in fact dierences may exist.
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My research does not rely on controlling for unobservable household variables
or the dynamic learning assumption. And unlike Duo et al. (2006), my experimen-
tal design tests for the actual impact of social networks, whereas the Duo et al.
(2006) experimental design attempts to estimate the eect of a training program at
diusing information across already-existing networks, but not the impact of social
networks themselves. Similar to Field et al. (2011), I directly perturb the networks
of our sample population by randomly pairing individuals within selected villages.
New pairs are encouraged to discuss their problems and solutions in growing cot-
ton, create a mutual long term goal for increasing cotton output, and re-exchange
information about growing cotton that they received in focus meetings. The SNI is
meant to encourage information ow across new links. In this way, I would like to
measure the actual impact of adding a new link to a grower's network.
The next four sections motivate the sample population selected for this study.
Section 3.6 explains the randomization. Section 3.7 outlines a simple model to moti-
vate my empirical estimation in Section 3.8. Section 3.9 tests the potential channels
by which the SNI is aecting outcomes. Section 3.10 concludes.
3.4 Women and Cotton in Uganda
I follow Baes (2008) and use female heads of households as our sample pop-
ulation. This avoids revisiting the issue of land ownership as a potential cause for
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gender specic productivity dierentials. I expect that the expansion of social net-
works for production, particularly for a new cash crop, has a high potential for
improving females' outcomes. The reason behind these expected gains is due to
females' networks traditionally being less oriented toward production alone than
males' (Edmeades et al., 2008; Katungi et al., 2006). This may be because females
face a starker tradeo between economic and non-economic social networks. While
males' days are delineated by morning work and afternoon discussion with other
males, women's days are often a simultaneous combination of work, child-care, and
household responsibilities. A wider range of household responsibilities raises the cost
and reduces the availability of acquiring new production techniques (Granovetter,
2005). Responsibilities close to the home also restrict females from participating in
geographically dispersed social networks and community projects, and force their
relations to be dependent on the collaborative tasks that they perform with other
females, i.e. collecting water, fuel, and harvesting crops (Maluccio et al., 2003).
Female-headed households are also more likely to be poorer or more marginalized
in their community, particularly those who have been widowed or divorced4. Hoang
et al. (2006) emphasizes that development workers' inadequate understanding of lo-
cal social networks, norms, and power relations may further the interests of better-o
farmers and marginalize the poor," who are disproportionately female. Large struc-
tural holes in females' production networks, therefore, likely exist, and establishing
new links with a like grower should create a more complete production network for
4However, divorced, separated or widowed females who are not subsumed back into male-headed
households, but retain some own property rights, are not necessarily the most resource constrained
individuals in rural society.
58
every farmer in a village by closing some of these gaps. Nascent and weaker links
are also more likely to propagate new and novel information along their paths, and
their introduction can potentially have the greatest impact (Granovetter, 1974; San-
tos and Barrett, 2005).
3.5 Data
Our full sample population is comprised of male- and female-headed house-
holds that grew cotton in 2008 in rural Uganda. The SNI was directed at female-
headed households5, while cotton training was administered to both groups. In the
rst stage, we randomly selected cotton growing villages from a complete list of all
cotton growing villages in one Eastern district (Bukedea District) and one Northern
district (Oyam District) of Uganda. We then stratied our sampling by female-
and male-headed household status. The SNI consisted of an in-depth survey of the
grower's social networks, participation in information games 6, in which participants
learned some of the information that would later be taught to them if randomly se-
lected for the training treatment, and being paired with a buddy in their village
area with whom they were encouraged to develop an agricultural link 7.
The pairing occurred by rst stratifying the cotton growing participants into
5The head of household was dened as the individual who made land, resources and income
allocation decisions in the household.
6The information games are detailed in the previous chapter.
7See end extension training sheets in the appendix, from which 10-12 points were taught via
the games.
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2 to 3 geographic areas of the village8, and then randomly pairing individuals. We
used a random number generator to print out lists of numbers randomly drawn from
a uniform distribution, U [0, x], where x represents the number of individuals in the
group. For example, if the group was comprised of 14 women, then x = 14. We
would then pair individual 1 with the rst listed number on the list of numbers
drawn from U[0,14]. If the rst number was 1 then we would select the next
number in the list, perhaps 3. Now 1 and 3 would be paired, 3 would be
crossed out, and we would continue down the list in this way until all 14 women
were paired. The pairing occurred among all the female-headed households in our
sample as well as the additional female cotton growers in the village who partici-
pated in the information games. A random re-pairing occurred if the individuals
were already neighbors, or if both were to receive training9 to maximize the eects
of networking.
3.6 Randomization
In order to capture the eect of a social network intervention, randomization
occurred at the village level as we would expect externalities from both programs,
SNI and TR, between the treated and untreated within a village. By randomizing
the SNI and TR programs across villages, I am able to measure the eect of the
SNI treatment, the TR treatment, and the complimentary eect of both treatments.
8This to ensure that females were not separated by large geographic constraints.
9This only occurred in villages that were selected for the TR.
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Figure 3.1 shows my three treatment groups: SNI, TR, and SNI+TR, that I will
compare to the control groups who received no treatments. Figure 3.2 shows the
breakdown of the SNI treatment, which will be exposited more fully in Section 3.9.
This gure indicates that most individuals participated in the games and pairing,
but a small group only participated in the pairings. Treatments Table 3.1 represents
the combinations of eects between the two treatments.
The rst round of a large-scale household survey was administered to 36 vil-
lages in 4 regions of Uganda: North (13 villages), Northeast (13 villages), West (5
villages) and West-Nile (5 villages)10 from February through May 2009. Figure 3.3
shows the sample size breakdown by treatment group. The household survey con-
sisted of questions on household demographics, input use and outputs for cotton and
other crops grown, household control of nancial assets including sales from cotton,
and a separate survey instrument on farmers' social networks regarding adoption,
cultivation and marketing of cotton. While only some villages were selected to re-
ceive one of two agricultural technology programs, every village in our sample was
visited by our team. Therefore, the eects from my results cannot be attributed
purely to a behavioral response to our visits.
To facilitate farmers learning proper cotton growing techniques, and to esti-
mate the impact of a low-budget agricultural training program, villages were ran-
10This results in a survey of 500 households. Approximately 175 households in each Northern
region and 75 households in each Western region were randomly selected for the survey.
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domly selected for participation in the TR. As Figure 3.3 shows, a total of 13 villages
received SNI, and 18 villages received TR. In each village, approximately 14 heads of
households were randomly selected to be visited by a local agronomist three times
a week to undergo ve training stages in 200911: pre-planting in March through
April; planting in May; pesticides use in July through August; harvesting in Oc-
tober through November; and marketing in December and January. Half of the
participant sample is female heads of households. Among the 18 villages randomly
selected for agricultural training, another subset of villages was chosen to participate
in the SNI. Among the 8 villages not selected for agricultural training, 4 received
the SNI and 4 did not.
In the SNI group, each pair received a Polaroid photo of themselves and their
team member, chose a team name, identied cultivation issues and chose a collabora-
tive goal, as well as potential times when they would meet to exchange information.
They then presented this to their peers at a group meeting. In this way they were
strongly encouraged to build a relationship around what they would learn in the
coming year about growing cotton via their new link, and have the group recognize
this.
11This was part of the larger RCT which implemented a cotton training program under Gender
Dimension of Cotton Productivity in Uganda led by Laoura Maratou (University of Maryland)
and John Baes (World Bank).
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3.7 Model
I use a conceptual model that is limited to the household's decision of choos-
ing inputs to produce cotton, given their access to new links and training, which
are exogenous in the model and in our data due to the design of SNI. I measure
the household's maximization of yields. It would be ideal to measure prots of the
individual farmer, which would incorporate the selling price of cotton and the cost
of labor and inputs12. An increase in prots, as opposed to yields, would ensure that
growing cotton improves a farmer's welfare and is in fact lucrative. However, assign-
ing shadow wages to family labor on cotton plots, and quantifying the hours worked
by family and hired labor is a daunting exercise that we did not feel would produce
accurate measures of prots. Rather, I assume that an increase in cotton yields does
translate into a increase in household welfare. I do have qualitative evidence from
the household surveys that the income produced from cotton is generally used on
such things as purchasing school supplies and covering medical costs that otherwise
would be foregone. Therefore, while I cannot show that cotton is the ideal choice
of cash crop, I do know that it does alleviate short term liquidity constraints for
subsistence farmers. In this way I believe that an improvement in yields is welfare
enhancing.
Household i chooses a vector of inputs, x̄, to maximize a production function
12It should be noted that the price of cotton is not determined by perfectly competitive market
forces.Cotton prices are set by the government's announcement of an indicative price. Although
the price is not xed, it is highly suggestive of what price ginners will pay for cotton at harvest
time (Baes, 2008).
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at time period t:





subject to a budget constraint p̄′x̄it ≤ Iit where t = 0....T , SN is a contin-
uous variable representing one aspect of the i's social network and is aected by
the exogenous variation from SNI: SN = f(SNI), and KN, knowledge, is aected
by the exogenous variation from the TR program KN = g(TR). The b, η, γ, and
δ are unknown parameters (for ease of notation I suppress the i subscript unless
necessary). I choose to model the problem statically, as the decision to grow cotton
is not a dynamic one in terms of inputs, i.e. cottonseed cannot be carried over from
one season to the next. Social networks would generally be modeled to evolve over
time, and could be endogenized in the model; however, their evolution, particularly
for females, is likely determined outside the realm of cotton production networks.
These diculties explain, in part, why I chose to introduce exogenous variation in
social network size and model networks as otherwise xed.
The sign and magnitude of η, γ, and δ is representative of the returns to output
from any one of these inputs, which is an empirical question to be answered with
the data. SN can be thought of as the sum of weighted links: SNit = Σi 6=jδ
nijtsnijt,
as in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), where nij is the number of links for the shortest
path between i and j (nij = ∞ if there is no path between i and j), snij is the
value of one link between i and j, and 0 < δ < 1 indicates that the value of a link
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is proportional to the distance between i and j.
The optimal, non-corner solution, will yield the function x∗t (SNt, KNt, It, p̄),
and the optimized production function13,
F ∗(x̄t





If F (.) = −e−(.)14, and substituting in SNI and TR for SN and KN respectively,
then taking logs gives us an estimatable function15:
log y∗t (SNt, TRt) = β + ηx
∗
t (SNt, TRt) + γSNt + δTRt (3.3)
I am interested in the dierence in outcomes between the control group versus the
treated groups as a result of a change in SNI, where SNI and TR equal one if an
individual received a new link or training, and zero otherwise. This is captured
by Equation 3.3 in rst dierences for those who did and did not receive the SNI,
controlling for the TR treatment:
log yt − log yt−1 = γ(SNt − SNt−1) + η(Xt −Xt−1) + δ(TRt − TRt−1) (3.4)
13For now I exclude income, I, and prices p̄, from my optimal solution, since my focus is on the
eects of SNI, and SNI relative to TR, on individuals' outcomes. Including them as controls would
reduce some of the variance in the error term, but estimates will remain unbiased based given my
identication strategy.
14This does not impose any strict assumptions on the utility function when F(.) is exponential,
and leads to a linear prediction of log yields. For instance the measure of Absolute Risk Aversion
with respect to x is not constant as it would be with only one input, is δU
2/δX
δU/δX = ηγ ∗ SNδ ∗KN.
Similarly, the relative risk aversion is ηXγ ∗ SNδ ∗KN.
15Taking the log of yields will also be useful empirically, as a number yields are close to zero,
and a log transformation re-weights the distribution towards the lower tail.
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This can also be written using a dummy variable for time16:
log yt = α+βt+ρSNIt+µTRt+νSNIxTRt+ηSNxTRxt+γSNtxt+δTRtxt (3.5)
As the model cannot capture all determinants of yields, we observe y with some
error u, such that Equation 3.5 becomes:
log yt = α+βt+ρSNIt +µTRt + νSNIxTR+ ηSNxTRxt+γSNIxt+ δTRxt+ut
(3.6)
Using the data on outcomes and treatments I can estimate Equation 3.6. As-
suming that the uit are iid distributed disturbances with some known distribu-
tion that are uncorrelated with the regressors, or E[SNItut|Zt] = 0 where Zt =
[SNIt, TRt, SNIxTRt, SNxTRxt, TRtxt], the estimated eect of the SNI, γ̂, will
be unbiased.
The estimation of η in 3.6 is equivalent to a triple dierence across both
treatments and time, and γ captures the double dierence across time and SNI.
The estimated γ̂ captures the average treatment eect (ATE) of the SNI that is:
γ = [E(y|SNI = 1, t = 1, TR = 0)− E(y|SNI = 1, t = 0, TR = 0)]
−
[E(y|SNI = 0, t = 1, TR = 0)− E(y|SNI = 0, t = 0, TR = 0)]
16Where holding TR constant at zero, we can see that the two specications yield equivalent
results:[(y|SNI = 1, t = 1, TR = 0) − (y|SNI = 1, t = 0, TR = 0)] − [(y|SNI = 0, t = 1, TR =
0)− (y|SNI = 0, t = 0, TR = 0)] = [(α+ ρ)− (α+ ρ+ β+ γ)]− [α− (α+ β)] = γ, just as it would
in the rst dierence equation if TR is held constat at 0.
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δ̂ captures the simultaneous average eect of SNI and TR17, on yields. The
ATE is equivalent to E[y|SNI = 1, t = 1, TR = 0]− E[y|SNI = 0, t = 1, TR = 0],
or the average treatment eect on the treated, where t = 1, and TR is held con-
stant at zero, if we believe that there would have been no dierence in yields be-
tween my treatment and control groups in the absence of the SNI and TR, i.e.
[E(y|SNI = 0, t = 1, TR = 0) = E(y|SNI = 0, t = 0, TR = 0)]. This is a fair
assumption to make, given that my program was randomly assigned. However, be-
cause we were fortunate enough to follow my control and treatment groups over
time, I can control for such trends, where β in Equation 3.6 captures:
E[y|SNI = 0, t = 0, TR = 0]− E[y|SNI = 0, t = 1, TR = 0] = α− (α + β)
or the dierential trend in yields over time in the absence of the interventions.
Because the SNI is an encouragement design, my estimates reveal the intent
to treat (ITT), or the intent to change individuals' networks. That is, everyone who
participates in the SNI meeting is regarded as having participated in the SNI, even
if she did not follow any of my suggestions over the course of the year.





F ∗() > 0, or the marginal impact of social networks is positive.
17δ = [E(y|SNI = 1, t = 1, TR = 0) − E(y|SNI = 1, t = 0, TR = 0)] − [E(y|SNI = 0, t =
1, TR = 0) − E(y|SNI = 0, t = 0, TR = 0)] − [E(y|SNI = 1, t = 1, TR = 1) − E(y|SNI = 1, t =





= γ(γ − 1) δ
2F ∗()
δ2SNI
≤ 0, or decreasing returns to scale in SNI.
(3) δyt
δsnt
= γδnij implies that the eect of an additional link to person j is
decreasing with the distance from j.
3.8 Empirical Estimation of Program Eects
A summary of the data is shown in Table 3.2. The data indicate that the in-
terventions were evenly allocated across control and treatment groups, with slightly
under half the total number of villages receiving the SNI, and slightly over half re-
ceiving TR. The average Ugandan cotton farmer in our sample produces between
100 and 200 kilograms per year. This concurs with previous studies on cotton pro-
duction in Uganda, which nd that the average subsistence farmer produces about
100 kilograms of cotton lint per annum, while an average US cotton farm yields
about 500 kilograms per acre (Baes, 2008). To situate this in tangible terms, one
kilogram of seed cotton18 yields 0.30 kilograms of cotton lintwhich could produce
one to two t-shirts for exampleand return 30-40 US cents (600-900 shillings per
kilogram) to a Ugandan farmer. Standard deviations for the yield of cotton (kilo-
grams per acre) and level of cotton (total kilograms produced) are particularly high.
This is due to the stark drop-o in production from 2009 to 2010, as well as to yields
being right-skewed, as seen in Figure 3.4. The average farmer produces less than
18Seed cotton refers to the harvested cotton lint and seed, where the seeds have not been ltered
from the lint. Cotton seed refers to the actual seeds that cotton produces.
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500 kilograms per season, which is well below the maximum farmer's production in
2009 of 2,000 kilograms, resulting in a high variance in yields.
The number of acres used to grow cotton ranges between one-half to one acre
on average. Land is generally not a scarce resource19, though having sucient la-
bor to clear and prepare the land is. Therefore measures of yield will reveal this
constraint, while the total kilograms of cotton harvested will not. I also summarize
yield per seed, denoted as ypseed, since yield per unit land alone may not reect
accurate planting technique and input use. For example, farmers with more seed are
able to replant in areas where no germination takes place, while another succeeds
with the rst round of seeds because of good technique. Both farmers may yield the
same, but the second farmer yielded more per seed. Yield per seed was 52 kilograms
in 2009 and fell down to 37 kilograms in 2010. It should be noted, however, that seed
is freely or nearly freely provided by cotton ginners, so that yield alone may be the
most appropriate outcome measure. The drop in yields, acreage used for cotton and
yield per seed, is the result of delayed rains in Northern and Eastern Uganda during
the course of the intervention. My interest remains in measuring the impact of the
SNI in two ways. First, I measure the impact that the SNI had on increasing the
probability that a household maintained cotton as a cash crop despite the drought.
Second, I estimate the impact that the SNI had on output, and intermediate input
decisions for farmers, while controlling for the impact of the TR intervention.
19Many households own land that is not cleared for production.
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3.8.1 Choice to Grow Cotton
I rst look at the impact of the SNI on farmers' decisions to grow cotton in
the presence of the training intervention, clustering all standard errors at the village
level to account for within village correlations between households' error terms on
outcomes. Table 3.3 estimates the eect of the SNI and TR on remaining a cot-
ton grower between 2009 and 2010, despite the adverse weather shocks mentioned
earlier. I use a Probit model to predict the probability that a grower continues to
grow cotton. Column 1 indicates that the presence of the SNI in a village positively
and signicantly impacted a farmer's decision to continue to grow cotton, where the
outcome variable is zero if the individual ceased to grow cotton in 2010, and equals
one if they planted cotton. The marginal eect of expanding a farmer's network
by one link increases the probability of remaining a cotton grower by 18%. On the
other hand, introducing training to a farmer increases the probability of remaining
a cotton grower by only 11% and is insignicant.
Table 3.3, Column 2, estimates an Ordered Probit model, where the decision
to not plant is 0, the decision to plant but then realize no yields is assigned a 1, and
the decision to plant and realize positive yields is assigned a 2. My estimates reveal
the signicance of the SNI and TR in eecting the outcome variable. Though from
a welfare perspective, I cannot state that growing cotton is necessarily an optimal
component to a household's production basket.
70
A hurdle model might also be appropriate, where the decision to plant is mod-
eled as a Logit or Probit, and conditional on a non-zero yield the distribution is
modeled as a Poisson. However, this model would not capture the dierence be-
tween a zero yield due to no attempt to plant cotton versus a zero yield where the
farmer made an attempt but yielded zero, which are two substantially dierent de-
cisions and outcomes. Table 3.3, Columns 3 and 4 estimate a hurdle Logit Poisson
model. Column 3 shows that the SNI had both a signicant impact on individuals'
decisions to continue growing cotton between 2009 and 2010 and a signicant impact
on the potential output that they realized. Even more surprising, the SNI had a
stronger and more signicant positive impact on growing behavior than the TR.
3.8.2 Cotton Output
Table 3.4 estimates Equation 3.6, the triple dierence in dierence (η coe-
cient), and dierence in dierence across the TR and SNI variables (γ and δ coe-
cients respectively), on log of yields in Columns 3 and 4. I also run my estimations
with yields in levels as I am interested in the interpretation of the programs' eects
on yields, not log yields, in Columns 1 and 2. I am interested in the coecients on
SNIxt, γ, and SNIxTRxt, η, that is, the pure impact of the SNI intervention over
time on outcomes, and the additive impact of the SNI relative to the TR treatment
over time. At the same time, I also check that the estimated coecients on SNI,
and TR are insignicant. SNI, and TR are dummies for having been selected for
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the SNI and TR treatments. They capture whether selected households are sig-
nicantly dierent in their yields from households who were not. Similarly, the t
variable measures whether there is a signicant time trend in yields, which I ex-
pect to be negative given the drop in yields between 2009 and 2010. The rst four
columns of Table 3.3 show my initial estimates in yields and log of yields. Selection
into the programs was random as indicated by the insignicant eect of TR and
SNI. The negative and signicant coecient with respect to t reveals the down-
ward trend in yields that is exhibited in the summary statistics of Table 3.2. The
estimated impacts of SNIxt, γ̂, and of SNIxTRxt, η̂ are insignicant. However,
both estimates are signicant under the log yields specication in Columns 3 and 4.
The additive eect of SNI on TR program is insignicant everywhere.
As Table 3.2 indicates, yields are overdispersed, where the variance in yields
exceeds its mean. As Figure 3.4 shows, the average producer, before and after the
treatments, is clustered below a 500 kilogram yield per year, so that the deviation
from the mean yield is quite high for those few producers in the right tail of the
distribution. Hence, the above result that the SNI treatment had an insignicant
impact is not surprising if the upper portion of the yield distribution could gain lit-
tle from the program. I would not expect a signicant impact from social networks
for the highest producers, who are already far above the mean yield, given that
their knowledge base is likely saturated for this type of information. It is farmers
with production yields in the low- to mid-quantiles that I would expect to benet
the most from new networks and basic growing information. I did not exclude top
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producing farmers from the study, however, because they may play a critical role in
information dissemination.
I now look at the average impact of the program for those producers located
around the mass of the yield distribution in Figure 3.4. These are individuals who
yielded 500 kilograms per acre or less in 2009. Those who yielded greater than 500
kilograms per acre in 2009 are removed from the sample, which constitutes 15% of
my original sample20.Columns 5 and 7 of Table 3.4 estimate Equation 3.6, condi-
tional on having grown 500 kilograms of cotton per acre or less in 2009:
E(logyt|yt < 500) = E(α + βt+ ρSNIt + µTRt + νSNIxTR (3.7)
+ηSNxTRxt+ γSNIxt+ δTRxt+ ut|yt < 500) (3.8)
They show that the SNI treatment has a positive and signicant impact on
yields and log yields respectively. Dropping down to households who harvested less
than 400 kilograms of cotton in 2009, reveals an even greater impact of SNI, as
shown in Columns 6 and 8. This result is also of economic signicance, as the av-
erage cotton yield in rural Uganda is 100-200 kgs per year, and the signicance of
these eects extend to households who began with yields of up to 400-500 kilograms.
That is, even households who are well above the mean yield, benet from the SNI.
20A household is dropped from the sample in both years if its yield in 2009 was less than 500 to
maintain a balanced panel.
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In fact, the impact of the SNI program for these producers ranges from 66 to 74
additional kilograms of cotton per acre, which is 50 % increase from the average
farmer's cotton yield between 2009 and 201021.
3.8.3 GLM Estimation
The above estimation assumes that E[ln(y)|X] = Xb, which shifts the distri-
bution of yields below zero when a small constant, c, is added to zero-valued yields.
It may be more appropriate to assume: ln(E[y|X]) = Xb, which can be estimated
by a generalized linear model with a log link. That is, the mean of the datum is
linked to its predictors by a logarithmic function. The benet of this specication is
that the conditional mean should be positive, but the realized outcome can be zero
(Nichols, 2010), something that occurs frequently in the labor literature with income
and wage data, and with developing country data where yields and income exhibit a
mass near zero. We need only to specify a distribution for (yi|Zi), so that the E[y|X]
is dened. My results are robust to several distributional specications (Gamma,
Poisson, Gaussian), but modeling the conditional yields as a Poisson distribution t
the data best. If (yieldi|Zi) ∼ P (µi), then the mean of the distribution is dened as
µi = exp(α+ βt+ ρSNIt + µTRt + νSNIxTRt + ηSNxTrxt+ γSNtxt+ δTRtxt).
Table 3.5 estimates Equation 3.6 using a GLM log link and Poisson distribution.
The signicance of SNI's eect still holds for producers producing 400 kilograms or
21The average yield across both years is 140 kilograms/acre. A 70 kilogram increase in output
would result in 50 % increase in yields for the average farmer.
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less, as seen in Column 2. The estimated marginal eects (not listed) of the SNI
from the GLM estimation are a 30% increase in yields for the average farmer, a 36%
increase for women, and a 19% increase for men.
3.8.4 Inputs for Cotton
There are two channels through which the SNI could impact yields: it could
change the input decisions for cotton production, and/or it may change the tech-
niques used by farmers (timing, weeding, thinning, and harvesting) to produce cot-
ton. The dierential impact of the SNI on outcomes between males and females
may be a result of a change, or lack thereof, in either intermediate step. I check
whether the SNI impacted the use of inputs in producing cotton.
In Tables 3.7 and 3.8 I look at the impact of the SNI on input use across the
entire sample, and for males and females separately, using yields and log yields in
a triple dierence. These estimations suggest that there is a shift in the number of
acres used for cultivating cotton, and a less consistent shift in the amount of seed
used as a result of the SNI. The seed results are strongest for the log-transformed
data, and remain signicant for the female sample, but not male.
That said, another channel through which the SNI may have impacted output
is through the improvement in planting techniques themselves. If input use has not
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changed substantially in our data, where seed use is controlled by the ginneries'
allocation of seeds to each household, and land use is constrained by available labor,
then the eects of the program can be largely attributed to changes in growing tech-
niques. In Section 3.9 I investigate further whether the improvements generated by
the SNI were caused by the information training conducted during the information
games or the generation of randomized pairings.
3.8.5 SNI and Training as Substitutes
I have found that the complementary impact of SNI on TR is insignicant,
that is, the estimate of η is insignicant in all of my specications. This may be-
cause the TR program induces its own social networking eect such that SNI does
not bring any additional gain to individuals who received TR. Therefore, each in-
tervention seems to aect individuals' outcomes independently. I therefore, look at
how the impact of the SNI (with and without TR) compares to the impact of TR
(with and without SNI).
Table 3.6, Column 1 and 2 allow us to compare the eect of the SNI for those
who received training compared to those who did not receive training in Columns
1 and 2. Column 2 compared to Column 1 shows that the SNI had its greatest
economic and statistical impact for individuals who did not receive TR, where SNI
increased yields by 74 kilograms per acre for those without TR22, versus 26 kilo-
grams per acre for those who did receive TR, which was insignicant. In Column
22We can also see this in Table 3.4 Column 6.
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4, I estimate the converse of Column 2; namely, the impact of TR for individuals
who did and did not receive the SNI. The results show that the eect of the TR
where there was no SNI administered increased yields by 82 kilograms per acre and
was signicant, but increased yields by 34 kilograms per acre where SNI did occur
and was insignicant. If I compare the eects of SNI versus TR, I see that the two
programs are of comparable ecacy for increasing cotton yields. Therefore, the two
programs appear to be feasible substitutes at increasing productivity in villages.
The results hold true for the GLM specication as well, as shown in Columns 4-6.
Whether social capital behaves as a substitute or complement to standard
training programs may depend on the program type itself. Jonathan Isham and Ra-
mawamy (2002) suggest that when programs are delivering private goods with large
information spillovers, then the inuence of social capital on information sharing is
high. The highest returns to investments in social capital, however, are when the
economic good that a development project is designed to deliver is characterized by
high levels of nonexclusiveness or non-rivalry. Of course, most training programs
aim to deliver new knowledge, where knowledge is the quintessential public good.
In that sense, I believe that the marginal investment in a social assessment will be
relatively small compared to the potential benets of the investment, regardless of
whether the agricultural training itself is meant to deliver a private good.
What is signicant about this nding is that, whereas a training program re-
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quires the coordination of several agricultural extension agents23: repeated travel
to remote villages along unpaved roads, as well as coordination with the recipients
of the training, the SNI is a one-time pairing of individuals and dissemination of
information. A training program such as TR would cost between 300-600 dollars per
village per year. Uganda has over 95 districts, each with around 10 sub-counties,
and 5-10 villages per sub-county. For a conservative estimate, for over ve thousand
villages, the cost of a training program could range from one to three million US
dollars (USD), depending on the number of trainers and their expertise. The SNI
would amount to a one-time travel cost and the time of one individual to organize
the SNI. At the national level the SNI would cost on the order of one hundred to
ve-hundred thousand USD.
3.8.6 Cumulative Impact
To gain a more complete picture of the SNI's impact on output for every
quantile of producers by output, I plot the marginal impact of SNI on yields, con-
ditional on households' yields being less than X kilograms per acre in 2009, where
X ∈ (0, 2000), and the estimates' corresponding t-statistics. Figures 3.5 and 3.6
plot the estimates of γ, the impact of SNI, from Equation 3.6 for yields< X for the
total sample of households, and for female-headed households alone. These graphs
conrm hypothesis (2), namely, that the marginal eect of SNI is decreasing for
23Agricultural education, extension and training programs ensure that information on new tech-
nologies, plant varieties and cultural practices reaches farmers and those who need them most.
78
higher yielding farmers. This also shows that the impact of the SNI is greatest for
female-headed households producing up to 400 kilograms per year. Females produc-
ing between 0 and 400 kilograms per year experience an increase in yields of up to
70 kilograms per acre for the additional link that is added to their social network,
as seen by the peak in the distribution in Figure 3.6.
The eect of the SNI also spills over to male-headed households in the lowest
quantile of producers, i.e. those yielding up to 200 kilograms per year, as seen in
Figure 3.7. The eects for males do not reach statistical signicance at the 10 %
level, but are nevertheless non-negligible. This conrms hypothesis (3), namely that
the value to a male farmer i of an additional link to person j is decreasing with the
distance to j. Granted, I do not directly test for this relationship by mapping the
networks within villages, and then estimating the average eect of the SNI program
along specic network paths. However, villages are quite small, and the individu-
als in our sample are very likely connected to one another within a few degrees of
separation. Therefore, males in the sample who did not participate in the SNI are
in some way connected to the females who did. Given that the females did expand
their networks, the males likely did so as well, and this appears to have a muted
eect on males' yields.
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3.8.7 Impact against Mean Yield
To avoid the bias generated by dropping individuals producing above a certain
yield, as I did for the previous Figures, I instead capture the local eect of SNI for
a rolling band-with, controlling for the TR programming. For a band-with of ±100
kgs/acre in 2009, the main regression is estimated repeatedly, and the SNI eect
is plotted against the mean yield for this sliding band-with using a non-parametric
polynomial regression with Epanechnikov kernel24. I plot the eects of the SNI and
TR to compare the distribution of the eects, with bootstrapped condence inter-
vals 25, Figures 3.10 and 3.11.
Figure 3.10 and 3.11 show that social network intervention aided growers who
started with very low production levels, whereas the training program aided farm-
ers across a greater spectrum. The total gains are comparable, but the distribution
of the eects is clearly dierent. These graphs show that SNI and Training may
appear to be substitutes on average, but along the distribution of producers, they
are eectively dierent tools for yield improvement. The SNI is best at assisting
the lowest producers, while it has no signicant eect beyond those producing 400
kgs/acre or more in 2009. Thus, it does not add additional value to the highest-end
producers, and appears to serve as an excellent poverty tool because it targets the
weakest producers. The training program in comparison has a more even eect, in-
24The Epanechnikov kernel down-weights observations farther from the mean where K(u) =
(3/4)(1− u2), where u = (x−xi)h , for −1 < u < 1, and u = o, for −1 > u < 1.
25Condence Intervals are wider at the upper tails because there are fewer producers in that
portion of the distribution.
80
creasing output for those who produced 400 kgs/acre, all the way up to 800 kgs/acre
in 2009. The training program, therefore, appears to be a much better tool for in-
creasing overall output, especially for higher producers. This would be relevant for
policies that would like to increase the growth of Uganda's cotton industry at the
global level26.
One further graph conrms the reported distribution of the SNI program ef-
fects. Figures 3.12 and 3.13 plot the marginal impact of the SNI and TR programs,
estimated within ve yield quantiles in 200927. For these estimates, I do not overlap
the band-widths for each estimation, hence the fewer estimates are plotted than
in the Figures 3.10 and 3.11. The graphs still conrm the overall trends in the
conditional eects of SNI and TR.
3.9 New Links or Information?
There are a two ways that I will test whether the eects that I pick up from
the SNI program are caused by learning or new networks. The rst method will
look at the impact of SNI and TR on individuals' true social networks over time,
and on the amount of information that they learned through the training programs.
If SNI aected networks and not learning, then I can deduce that it was through
26Estimates for the higher level producers, however, are not ecient, given that there are few
individuals in our sample producing above 600 kgs/acre.
27The rst quantile has an average yield of 52 kilograms per acre; the second quantile has an
average yield of 87 kilograms per acre; The third quantile has an average yield of 140 kilograms
per acre; the rst quantile has an average yield of 290 kilograms per acre; and the last quantile
has an average yield of 463 kilograms per acre.
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networks, primarily, that the SNI program had its greatest impact.
To do this, I will rst check the impact of the SNI and TR programs on per-
ceived and stated size of social networks between 2009 and 2010. Secondly, I will
test the impact of the SNI and TR programs on the information learned on yields.
I can devise a measure of information correctly learned and stated using surveyees'
results from a quiz that we included in the 2010 follow-up household survey, ad-
ministered to all participants in the treatment and control groups. I calculate the
percentage of correctly answered questions out of 12 questions. I also have computer
scores of information learned during the games in 2009, but unfortunately, non-SNI
treatment groups did not participate in these games, so I cannot conduct a panel
analysis of the eects of SNI on information learned.
As a check to my cross sectional results, I compare them with my previous
panel estimates. Namely, I repeat the rst regression of yields on the SNI and TR
programs using the 2009-2010 panel, and then compare this SNI eect to the SNI ef-
fect when using only the 2010 cross section. Given that the assignment of programs
is random, the impact of SNI and TR should not be statistically dierent whether
I use panel or cross-sectional data. The slope estimates on SNI are statistically sig-
nicant in predicting yields at the 10% level and in predicting information learned
at the 5% level.
Table 3.9 shows that the impact of SNI is statistically signicant in explaining
their grade on the survey quiz of the twelve information points in year two of the
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study. The impact of SNI is not signicant in explaining an individual's potential
change in network size from 2009 to 2010. This may suggest that receiving the in-
formation via social networks versus increasing network size is the channel by which
the SNI program aected outcomes most. Of course, we should keep in mind that
the program only encouraged a change in network size by one link.
The second way in which I can check whether information or new links is
driving the eect of SNI on yields is by focusing on the subset of females who
participated in the pairings meetings and the social network survey, but who were
unable to attend the initial information games. I create another treatment variable,
Information, denoting whether an individual attended the meetings and networked
(=1), or simply was paired with an individual in round 2 (=0). If SNIxt remains
signicant after having controlled for Information, then I might conclude that
the program's eect is operating via the rst meeting and information games, and
not through the second meeting of pairings. Might, because having received the
information is conditional on the choice to attend the information game meetings,
which we cannot observe, biasing my estimate of Information's eect.
Table 3.10 includes the estimates of the Information variable in the panel
model, including a spline for individuals producing about 400 kilograms per acre.
The spline helps us to avoid dropping observations for yields above 400 in 2009.
The estimated model shows that Information is not quite signicant in explaining
the change in yields. TR remains signicant, but the SNI becomes insignicant.
Thus, these results also support that it is the rst game meeting that seemed to
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have the most impact on yields from conducting the SNI. However, these results
are not conclusive given the endogeneity of Information, and because I only have
cross-sectional data from 2010 to estimate the impact of the SNI on learning and
networks. Therefore, neither individual random eects in the error term nor indi-
vidual xed eect variables as regressors can be used to control for unobservable
variation that may be correlated with Information.
3.10 Discussion
This is the rst experimental design in the development literature to identify
the causal impacts of social networks on productive agricultural outcomes. Previ-
ous research has not been able to claim a causal eect of social networks, while
other literature estimated the eect of a training program at propagating new infor-
mation across existing networks. To circumvent these shortcomings, I exogenously
perturbed networks, focusing only on females, whose output lags behind men's and
whose potential to improve yields via social networks appeared to be large. My
estimates are robust to several specications, including a generalized linear model
that approximates a linearized production function for yields of cotton.
I estimated the SNI's own impact, and additive impact on the TR program
using linear regression, log linear, and generalized linear model with a log link for
mean yields. All of my results indicate that the SNI had a signicant impact on
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yields for individuals who produced less than 500 kilograms per acre in 2009, where
the average Ugandan farmer produces between 100 and 200 kilograms per acre per
year. In particular, the dierence in dierence estimates of SNI on yields shows that
an additional link in conjunction with encouraged learning increases yields by about
70 kilograms per acre, and this eect declines for the highest yielding farmers. Much
of this impact is driven by an increase in females' yields in villages where there was
no TR, and seems to be driven by the learning that occurred across new links, rather
than through instigating a substantial change in network size.
The additive impact of SNI on TR is insignicant. Essentially, the two pro-
grams provide dierent methods of training individuals, at widely dispersed costs,
with distinctly dierent eects along the distribution of producers. In comparison
to the training intervention, the SNI has its greatest impact for the lowest-yielding
farmers making it a low cost tool for reducing poverty. This is a substantial nd-
ing, given that females comprise 80% of the agricultural labor force in Uganda, yet
rarely receive direct agricultural training. Furthermore, female-headed households
can serve as an example for others of how low yielding producers more generally can
increase their production.
3.11 Figures and Tables
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Table 3.1: Treatments, Sample Size
TR No TR Totals
SNI 96 59 155
No SNI 120 50 170
Totals 216 109 325
Table 3.2: Means in 2009 & 2010
2009 2010 Total
Social Network 0.475 0.475 0.478
Intervention (SNI) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Training 0.658 0.658 0.660
Intervention (TR) (0.474) (0.475) (0.474)
Sex 0.48 0.48 0.48
(Female=1) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Kgs Cotton 140.8 79.54 109.9
(201.5) (129.2) (171.6)
Acres 0.983 0.586 0.783
(0.701) (0.593) (0.678)
Yield (Kgs/Acre) 182.0 139.5 160.6
(208.7) (234.9) (223.1)
Kgs Seed 4.976 3.232 4.097
(3.799) (3.000) (3.527)
Yield Per 52.83 36.96 44.83
Seed (78.32) (62.70) (71.27)
Mean of each variable with standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 3.3: Probit, OProbit, HPlogit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0=Dropped 1=Attempted Hurdle (Logit) Hurdle (Poisson)
0=Dropped 1=Attempted&0 2=>0
logit & Poisson
SNI 0.565** 0.699*** 0.922** 0.335**
(2.272) (3.115) (2.208) (2.022)
TRAINING 0.334 0.428** 0.578 0.241
(1.579) (2.286) (1.614) (1.536)
TrxSNI 0.0657 0.0159 0.212 -0.184
(0.207) (0.0558) (0.409) (-1.078)
Observations 325 325 325 325
Robust z-statistics in parentheses





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.5: Double Dierence, GLM




DD GLM GLM GLM
t -0.944*** -1.109*** -1.482*** -1.012***
(-3.714) (-2.989) (-2.760) (-2.706)
SNI 0.268 -0.155 -0.497* 0.0489
(1.484) (-0.767) (-1.916) (0.226)
TR 0.107 -0.0277 -0.0124 -0.0213
(0.659) (-0.149) (-0.0680) (-0.102)
TrxSNI 0.348 0.592* 0.226
(1.389) (1.774) (0.846)
SNIxt 0.173 1.001** 1.468** 0.862*
(0.682) (2.351) (2.126) (1.910)
TRxt 0.774*** 1.206*** 1.020* 1.554***
(3.502) (2.621) (1.669) (3.279)
TRxSNIxt -0.830 -0.694 -1.168**
(-1.585) (-0.884) (-2.096)
Constant 4.993*** 4.874*** 4.847*** 4.884***
(34.63) (33.93) (49.53) (28.92)
Observations 646 592 288 304
Robust z-statistics in parentheses

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.9: Cross Sectional Impact: SNI on Yields
(1) (2) (3)
Yield SNI on Information Learned SNI on Network Size
SNI 60.18* 0.0483** 0.273
(1.710) (2.307) (0.621)
TRAINING 102.8* 0.0406* 0.677
(1.848) (1.701) (1.512)
TrxSNI 1.976 -0.0375 -0.780
(0.0262) (-1.052) (-1.430)
Constant 42.33*** 0.378*** 3.708***
(2.854) (25.95) (10.96)
Observations 325 324 263
R-squared 0.057 0.021 0.012
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.10: Another Treatment Group
Learning or Networks?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yield
VARIABLES TRIPLE D: Yield Yield Networks Control for Info
t -97.84*** -98.97*** -1.947 -65.90**
(-4.258) (-4.203) (-1.654) (-2.573)
SNI 58.85 526.1*** -1.258 535.9***
(1.608) (11.83) (-1.006) (10.52)
TRAINING 26.98 39.21 -0.498 56.53**
(0.744) (1.029) (-0.395) (2.486)
TrxSNI -15.22 29.36 2.034
(-0.258) (0.673) (0.870)
SNIxt 1.332 101.3*** 0.559 3.998
(0.0453) (3.494) (0.397) (0.143)
TRxt 75.83* 76.06* 1.488 24.18
(1.751) (1.758) (0.964) (0.864)
TRxSNIxt 17.20 -114.9** -2.857
(0.346) (-2.337) (-1.125)
dummy400xSNI -570.4*** 1.108 -564.6***
(-13.09) (1.163) (-12.61)






Constant 140.2*** 188.3*** 6.916*** 188.4***
(7.126) (5.402) (4.535) (5.013)
Observations 646 646 529 646
R-squared 0.047 0.368 0.015 0.371
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 3.1: Experimental Design: Overall Program
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Figure 3.2: Experimental Design: Social Networking Program
Figure 3.3: Sampling Villages
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Figure 3.4: Non-Parametric Frequency of Yields
Figure 3.5: Cumulative Eect of SNI on Yields
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Figure 3.6: Cumulative Eect of SNI on Yields for Females
Figure 3.7: Cumulative Eect of SNI on Yields for Males
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Figure 3.8: Cumulative Eect of SNI on Yields, Estimated by GLM
Figure 3.9: Cumulative Eect of SNI on Yields for Females, Estimated by GLM
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Figure 3.10: Eect of SNI by Mean Yield
Figure 3.11: Eect of TR by Mean Yield
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Figure 3.12: Eect of SNI by Quantile
Figure 3.13: Eect of TR by Quantile
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Chapter 4
What Have We Learned?
The focus in development on testing local programs has become a favored
tool for identifying the variables that aect progress most. Randomizing the treat-
ment of those programs allows researchers to separate a variable's eect from the
many other confounding channels that simultaneously aect individuals' outcomes.
By randomizing the encouragement of new links and new information across this
study's sample, I am able to parse out the causal impact of social capital (new links
and their information) on individuals' yields. This is a contribution to the academic
literature on social networks, but also a stepping stone for development programs
overall. An essential component to any training program is its ability to have sus-
tainable eects. I nd that the latter depends on how well a program can leverage
existing networks, and germinate newer networks as well.
Agricultural development is a foundational step to progressing past rural
poverty, yet one of the most dicult to implement. Agricultural programs require
time, inputs, and transmission of new knowledge. The SNI is a program that in-
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creased farmers' output without the continual intervention of outside agents, which
the TR required. In addition to potentially serving as a poverty-reducing tool,
the SNI also circumvents the potential biases towards male-focused training that
exist in developing countries , and the barriers in networking between males and
females. As such, my ndings are relevant to the developing country context where
males disproportionately receive more training programs as compared to females,
and where there is limited information exchange across genders. Utilizing local
informal institutions can be more impactful than traditional training programs in
terms of beneting the most vulnerable producers in a community, and at a fraction
of the cost. This is because a program that draws its strength of communication
from existing ties is much more likely to inuence the peripheral and small yield-
ing producers than a training program, which benets the already highest yielding
producers.
As Jonathan Isham and Ramawamy (2002) stress, it is important that such
ndings on social capital be given a context for policy practitioners. A pinch of trust
with a dash of social cohesion; then let simmer for six or seven centuries is not a
strategy for development. As a practical implementation of my ndings, I advocate
that for optimal eects, programs similar to the actual social network intervention
outlined here be used, rather than the more traditional idea of advocating groups,
such as farmers' groups or female groups. I nd, from the experimental extension of
this work, and through my qualitative studies, that promoting groups strengthens
already existing social structures in a village, while developing new and random
links helps to propagate new information from peripheral individuals, whose voices
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might otherwise be subsumed by a well regulated social structure. Furthermore, I
nd that competitive incentives, rather than group incentives, are better at propa-
gating information exchange amongst females.
While this research shows that social network-based training can bootstrap the
worst-o females, we cannot forget that the same program may not produce sim-
ilar results for males, and that female-targeted programs may not improve overall
welfare of a society if we do not also work with men. As Jemimah Njuki, a Kenyan
sociologist and gender specialist at the International Livestock Research Institute
(ILRI) aptly stated at the Institute for Food and Policy Research in January 2011,
If we do not put money in pockets of men, we will not manage to put money in
the pockets of women (Njuki, 2011). What is useful about this evaluation of the
SNI, is that the general equilibrium impacts of the SNI are measured. Namely, I
calculate the average impact of the SNI by village estimating the impact on the
yields of both female and male respondents, and also separately for both males and
females. The eects of the program do not seem to have negative spill over eects
on males. Quite the opposite, males of the lowest-producing quantile, in fact, im-
prove indirectly from the females' SNI program. Even incorporating a handful or
less of high-yielding male farmers into female-targeted programs, could be enough
to quell a village's concerns that the program is unfairly targeting females. In most
villages, I found that once males understood that females were being educated in
agricultural information that were bringing them up to par, their beliefs that the
program would threaten their own social standing and agricultural output dissolved.
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In all cases, males were allowed to observe the information games, but were asked
not to participate.
There are several outcomes that I take from this research, which can also be
extended to development research and programs in other parts of SSA, Africa at
large, and developing countries, where individuals live without the tools that allow
for constant and accessible communication. No doubt, applying this research could
not be uniform even across a country, but the purpose behind the training method-
ology outlined here is founded on the idea that individuals know what is useful for
them. In identifying network eects, I nd that female farmers naturally absorb
information when the proper incentives provide open channels for communication.
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5.1 12 Game Points
1. Ladybirds are good insects (show picture)
2. Spacing between rows is 75 cm (3 sheets long)
3. Spacing between plants is 30 cm long (1 sheet)
4. Only plant 3-5 seeds per hole
5. More than 2 seedlings in one place will reduce cotton yield
6. First weeding occurs between the 2nd and 3rd week after planting
7. Second weeding occurs between the 6th and 10th week after planting
8. Bollworm (show picture) larvae appears between the 8th and 9th week after
planting
9. Cover mouth and hands with clothe with applying pesticides. It's harmful to
your health.
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10. Check germination after 5 days-replants seeds at gaps to get even crop cover
11. Prepare land several weeks in advance for cotton planting
12. Cotton is good for mixed and rotational crop
13. At most, breastfeed children no more than 2 years







5.3.1 Social Network Survey
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Section A-Identifying key individuals in networks for adopting cotton.  
FO: Please reference photocopied 2008 SN list for this household. Maintain same Name spellings, but order of peoples may change.  
NAME 
of respondent 
Person ID Name, in order of importance, all the villagers whom 
you believe are most knowledgeable on  growing 
COTTON in your village, even if you do not 
directly talk to them. 
Name, in order of importance, all the villagers 
whom you believe are most knowledgeable on 
issues regarding your everyday VILLAGE 
affairs, even if you do not directly talk to them. 
Name ID AN1 AN2 
    
  1 1 
  2 2 
  3 3 
  4 4 
  5 5 
  6 6 
  7 7 
  8 8 
  9 9 
  10 10 
  11 11 
  12 12 
  13 13 
  14 14 
  15 15 
  16 16 
  17 17 
  18 18 
  19 19 




8 March 2010        HHID:_____ 
 2
Section B-Identifying links in cotton growing. FO: Please reference photocopied 2008 SN list for this household. Maintain same Name spellings, but order 











































































  (answer 
BN4 before 
BN5) 
Starting with the CG you talk 
to the most, name the villagers 
the CG talk(ed) to most about 
growing cotton.   
(Do not change BN4 if the total # 
in BN5 does not match BN4. 
 
















































































Name Name CG  BN
1 






BN11 BN12 BN12 
Units 
               
      1         
      2         
      3         
      4         
      5         
      6         
      7         
      8         
      9         
      10         
      11         
      12         
      13         
      14         
      15         
      16         
      17         
      18         
      19         
      20         
 
















Relist individuals named in 
BN5 here. (initials are 
sufficient)  
Is this person’s 
cotton plot 
allocated next to 
yours (can you 
see their cotton 
























































How did you 




































BN14 BN15 BN16 BN16 
Units 
BN17 BN18 BN19 BN20 BN21 CN2 
             
   1          
   2          
   3          
   4          
   5          
   6          
   7          
   8          
   9          
   10          
   11          
   12          
   13          
   14          
   15          
   16          
   17          
   18          
   19          
   20          
 
 
Section CN-Information Exchange 



















Please relist  the 
individuals you named 
in BN5/BN14 here.   
(initials are sufficient) 
What was the most 
significant advice 
that YOU GAVE 






Codes below in 
main 
questionnaire. 









Codes possible  

























































How much did 
you  expect the 
INDIVIDUAL 
prize to be worth 
in the women’s 
meeting last year  
( UG shillings) 
-99 did not 
participate in 
women’s meeting 
How much did you 
expect the GROUP 
prize to be worth in 
the women’s 
meeting last year  
( UG shillings) 





ID  CN1 CN3 CN4 CN5 CN6 CN7  BN22 CN8 CN9 
             
   1          
   2          
   3          
   4          
   5          
   6          
   7          
   8          
   9          
   10          
   11          
   12          
   13          
   14          
   15          
   16          
   17          
   18          
   19          











Codes for Social Network Survey 
 
Code for BN1:  
1=I currently grow cotton on my own. 
2=I currently grow cotton with other family 
members 
3= I currently grow cotton with hired labor 
(and family members) 
4=I grew cotton in the past, but no longer 
grow cotton 
5=I am considering growing cotton this 
season 
6=No, I have not grown, do not currently 
grow, and am not considering growing 
cotton 
Code for BN2: 
1=I have sold seed-cotton that I 
grew  
2=I have sold seed-cotton that I 
helped to cultivate 
3=I have watched a friend or 
relative sell seed-cotton 
4=No, I have not sold nor 




Code for BN6: 
0=Does not apply 
1=Sick 
2=Old 
3=Has well connected close family 
member to consult 
4=Cotton is not their primary 
concern/crop 
5=Does not know how to meet more 
cotton growers 
6= other (write in cell) 
 






6=draft animals (write 
number of draft animals) 
Example if 3 oxen write: 
6(3)  
7= other (write in cell) 
9=spray pump 
Code for  BN20: 
0=growing agent 
1=family 
2= friends within the 
village 






6= Other (write in cell) 
 
 
Code for BN21: 
0=Only Agricultural info. 
1=borrowing/lending and 
informal credit 





6= child care/family 
7=other(write in cell) 
 
 
Code for CN3 and CN4: 
Growing: 
0=no information given/received 
1=land type necessary to grow 
cotton 
2=size of cotton plot 
3=machines necessary to grow 
cotton 
4=draft animals (borrowing etc.) 
 
5=contacts necessary to 
grow cotton 
6=seed spacing 
7=inputs necessary for 
growing cotton (seeds, 
fertilizer, pesticides) 
8= application of 
pesticide/fertilizer 
9=laborers (including 
number of laborers to 
hire and who to hire) 




11=when to sell my cotton (exact day and time of day) 
12=when to sell my cotton (what week) 
13=when to sell my cotton (general annual advice) 
14=whom to sell my cotton to 
15=with whom I should go sell my cotton  
16=how to sell my cotton  (what to say) 
17=how to receive cotton prices (via cell phone, radio, ginnery, etc.)  
18=storage of cotton 
19=other (write in space provided below) 
Code for CN6: 
1=too costly 
2=no perceived benefit 
3=implemented in the past 
4=land not available or not 
ready 
5= other (write in cell) 
Code for CN11:  
1=family, 2=friend 
3=fellow church member 
4=neighbor 




5.3.2 Household Survey (Relevant Portions)
These are the relevant portions with regards to my research of the household
survey. It does not include the full household survey.
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Draft 35 
Gender Dimension of Cotton Productivity in Uganda (WB-GAP) 
        Household-Level Survey in Uganda (February-April 2010)  
World Bank, University of Maryland and Makerere University 
Did the household grow cotton in 2009? (1= Yes, 2=No;) 
___________________________ 
Date of interview  Date:         Month:         Year: _________ 
 
Interviewed  by    _____________________ 
 
Date checked: Date:         Month:         Year: _________ 
 
Checked by:   __________________        
 
Date entered:  Date:         Month:         Year: _________ 
 
Data entered by:   _____________________ 
 
 
  Household ID: ___________________ 
 
  District: ___________________ Code:_____________ 
 
  County: ___________________ Code:_____________ 
 
  Sub-County:_________________ Code:_____________ 
 
  Parish: ___________________ Code:_____________ 
 
  LC1:  ___________________ Code:_____________ 
 
    Village:  ___________________ Code:_____________ 
 
GPS Reading for Homestead 
Latitude Reading - North:  Longitude Reading – East   




Area of Cotton Plot 
Person ID______________ 
PID Cotton Plot :__________ 
Season cotton cultivated on this plot (cirlce season AND year) : 
1st or 2nd  Season       :           2009 or  2010 
Area :________________Square Meters
 Household Head Name _________________________   
 
Main Respondent  _______________      ID: __________ _  
 
Ethnicity of HH Head  _______________  Code: ___________ 
 
Religion of HH Head    _______________  Code: ___________ 
 
Please read the following consent statement to the respondent before starting the interview:  
My name is [your name]. I am part of a team of Researchers from Makerere University. We are collecting information here in [district] on cotton production, 
marketing, and expenditures.  
Your household has been selected to participate in the information gathering exercise, through a one-to-one interview. The discussion will take about some 
time. Please answer all the questions truthfully. You will not be judged on your responses and we ask you to be sincere in your responses.  
 
There is no direct benefit, money or compensation to you in participating in this study. Your participation is voluntary. However, the information you provide 
during this interview will help Makerere University to understand the needs of cotton farmers in [district], and to plan on how best to assist them to move 
forward. The researchers will keep your responses confidential.   
HHID: ____________ 
Section 1-a.  Demography / Gender dimension of decision-making 
A  “household” includes all members of a common decision making unit (usually within one residence) that are sharing income and other resources.  Include workers 
or servants as members of the household.  Ask the following questions about a person who was part of the household at least one month in the last 12 months.  Use an 





















































































































































sick , i.e. 
bedrest 






ID Name D13 D14 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 D13 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 










































Section 2.  Map of Parcels:  Please draw a map of all parcels that this household has access to (exclude communal grazing 
lands) . FO: Do not copy 2008 Map.  
When drawing this map, face East and draw directions.   Make sure to include homestead, fallowed land, abandoned land, leased out land, etc.  And give each 
parcel a short name (PNAME) and number, which becomes Parcel ID (PID).  This map should be clear enough so that enumerators who visit this household in one year should be able 
to identify each field for the last 2 cropping seasons. Indicate the homestead and entrances, names of parcels, sizes of parcels, and walking distances in minutes between the homestead 

































Section 3-a.  Land Tenure during last 2 cropping seasons. FO: Please keep PName and PID same as in 2008 Section 3A. See 






If you were to buy/rent-in 


































































































































































be willing to 
pay to buy? 
How much 
would you 
be willing to 
pay to rent 
in per 
season? 
PName PID L31 L32 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 L10 L11 L12 L13 L14 L15 L16 
 1                   
 2                   
 3                   
 4                   
 5                   
 6                   
 7                   
 8                   
 9                   
 10                   
 11                   
 12                   
 
Code for L5: 
1= Owner 
2= Occupant 
3= Tenant (who actually 
pays rents in cash or 
in-kind) 
 





5= Other (specify) 
 
Code for L8: 
1= Purchased 
2= Received as gift or 
inheritance 
3= Rented-in for fixed 
payments 
4= Borrowed-in 
5= Just walked in 
6= Other (specify) 
 
Code for L10 and L11: 
1= No right to sell/give 
2= With approval from 
extended family 
3= With approval from 
local authority 
4= Can sell/give land 
without approvals   





4=owner of parcel left 
village 






Section 3-b.  Land Use and Conservation Practices 
Ask the following questions on every single parcel identified in Section 5-a in the same order.  Make sure that the tables are matched across sections. 
 




























































































PName PID L17 L18 L19 L31 L32 L22 L23 L24 L25 L26 L27 L28 L29 L30 
 1               
 2               
 3               
 4               
 5               
 6               
 7               
 8               
 9               
 10               
 11               
 12               
 
Code for L18-21:   
1= Cultivated cotton 
2=Cultivated (annual crops) non-cotton 
3=Cultivated (perennial crops) 
4=Rented-out for fixed payments 
5=Sharecropped-out 
6=Borrowed-out 
7= Improved/bush fallow 
8=Grazing/ Pasture land 





Codes for L32: 
1=land/soil deterioration 
2=parcel sold  
3=parcel gifted away 









Section 3-c.  Additional source of income from Renting and Borrowing LAND in the last 12 months (last 2 cropping seasons: 
1st season 2009 and 2nd season 2009).FO:List ALL parcels as on pg 3, Section 3a. 
* Transaction ID: Number starts from one in each parcel. 
















Is all or a part of this parcel 







6=None of the above (Go 














For how many months
 has this area (LR2) 
been under this  
transaction? 
How did you decide 
the payment for this  
land?  
 
See code below. 
If LR4=1 or 3, how 




If LR4=2 or 4, what 
proportion (out of 10) 
of the harvest did you 
pay/ receive? (per 
season) 
 
Pname PID T ID LR1 
TCode LR2 LR3 LR4 LR5 LR6 
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
Code for LR4 
1= Before the production, a fixed cash 
payment 
2= Before the production, a fixed 
share proportion of the harvest 
3= After the harvest, a fixed cash 
payment 
4= After the harvest, a fixed 
proportion of the harvest 
5= Other (specify) 
6=No payment 
7= Before the production, a fixed 
output payment 









Section 3-d.  Land Holdings at the Start of the Household 




How much did you pay for bride price and in which year for each wife? 
 
Person Person ID** Year of marriage Land*** in acres Other in-kind assets in Shs (value) Cash in Shs 
 ID  BP1 BP2 BP3 
Spouse 1      
Spouse 2      
Spouse 3      
Spouse       
*The year of starting the household is the year when the head/spouse joined the household.  
**If the spouse was deceased before the survey and his/her person ID is not available, write 99.  
*** Exclude the land which the head/spouse temporary rented in at the start of the household. 
















Section 4-a. Harvest & inputs use– Second  Crop Season 2009  (September – December 2009 Harvest)  
What are the quantities and values of crops that the household has harvested during the SECOND SEASON? 
Ask about the ALL crops of the household, such as maize, beans, coffee, including feeding stuff (fodder leaves, elephant/Napir grass) and tree products (fruits).  Start with a parcel and 
a crop in the parcel, then ask for crops intercropped with the crop.  And move on to next crop.  Use extra sheets if necessary.  Complete the left part of the table first, cross checking 
with pg 2.  Ask for each PLOT not for each crop, so as to save time. OPV= open pollinated varieties.  
 
Seed Use 
Organic and Inorganic Fertilizer Use (w/OUT 
water) 
(Convert quantity in kgs) 
1st Fertilizer used 2nd Fertilizer used 





























































t % of the 


































































PID S0 CName CID S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      







Section 4-b.  Harvest – Second Crop Season 2009-10 (September – December 2009- winter 2010 Harvest) 
Ask the following questions on every single crop identified in Section 6-a in the same order.  Make sure that the tables are matched across the sections (pg7-8). 
Harvest 
 
Amount Sold  
(footnote multiple sales by unit, 
price/unit, amount for each sale) 
Amount stored 
(footnote multiple sales by 
unit, price/unit, amount for 
each sale) 
Amount consumed (incl. 
gifts) (footnote multiple 
sales by unit, price/unit, 
































































PID S0 CName CID S18 S19 S20 S21 S22 S23 S24 S25 S26 S27 S28 S29 S30 S31 S32 S33 
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    



























 Section 5-a - Labour Use on Crop Production – Second Crop Season 2009 (September Dec2009  Harvest) 
Ask about both family & hired labour use on a representative cotton plot, and one most important crop of the household such as maize, beans, and sunflower.   
Family Labour Use in the Second Crop Season 2009 Hired Labour 
in the 2nd 
Season 
Hired Draft animals 
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Activity Code (LS1) 
1= clearing land 
3=1st ploughing 
 
4=  2nd ploughing 
5= planting 
6=1st weeding 
7=2nd weeding  





13=4th spraying  
14=5th spraying 
15= Harvesting  
16= Watering crops 
 
17= Transporting the produce  
18= Post harvest activities 





Section 5-a – Continued 
Family Labour Use in the Second Crop Season 2009 Hired Labour 
in the 2nd 
Season 
Hired Draft animals 




























































































































































LS14 LS15 LS16 LS17  LS18 LS19 
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
 
Activity Code (LS1) 
1= clearing land 
3=1st ploughing 
 
4=  2nd ploughing 
5= planting 
6=1st weeding 
7=2nd weeding  





13=4th spraying  
14=5th spraying 
15= Harvesting  
16= Watering crops 
 
17= Transporting the produce  
18= Post harvest activities 






Section 6-a. Harvest & inputs use– First Crop Season 2009  (March – July 2009 Harvest) 
What are the quantities and values of crops that the household has harvested during the FIRST SEASON? 
Ask about ALL crops of the household, such as maize, beans, coffee, including feeding stuff (fodder leaves, elephant/Napir grass) and tree products (fruits).  Start with a parcel and a 
crop in the parcel, then ask for crops intercropped with the crop.  And move on to next crop.  Use extra sheets if necessary.  Complete the left part of the table first.   
 
Intercroppi
ng Seed Use 
Organic and Inorganic Fertilizer Use 
(Convert quantity in kgs) 
1st Fertilizer used 2nd Fertilizer used 

































































you need for 














































 Type Quantity in kgs
Value 






PID S0 CName CID F0 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 F16 F17 
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      







Section 6-b.  Harvest – First Crop Season 2009 (March – July 2009 Harvest) 
Ask the following questions on every single crop identified in Section 6-a in the same order.  Make sure that the tables are matched across the sections. 
Harvest 
 
Amount Sold  
 


































































PID S0 CName CID F18 F19 F20 F21 F22 F23 F24 F25 F26 F27 F28 F29 F30 F31 F32 F33 
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
 




























 Section 7-a - Labour Use on Crop Production – First Crop Season 2009 (March – July 2009 Harvest) 
Ask about both family & hired labour use on 1 most important crop of the household such as maize, beans, and sunflower.    
Family Labour Use in the  First Crop Season 2009 Hired Labour 
in the 2nd 
Season 
Hired Draft animals 




























































































































































LF14 LF15 LF16 LF17  LF18 LF19 
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
 
Activity Code (LS1) 
1= clearing land 
3=1st ploughing 
 
4=  2nd ploughing 
5= planting 
6=1st weeding 
7=2nd weeding  





13=4th spraying  
14=5th spraying 
15= Harvesting  
16= Watering crops 
 
17= Transporting the produce  
18= Post harvest activities 
19= Other (specify) 
 
-13- 




Section 7-a – CONT. Labour Use on Crop Production – First Crop Season 2009 (March – July 2009 Harvest) 
Ask about both family & hired labour use on 1 most important crop of the household such as maize, beans, and coffee  
Family Labour Use in the  First Crop Season 2009 Hired Labour 
in the 2nd 
Season 
Hired Draft animals 




























































































































































LF14 LF15 LF16 LF17  LF18 LF19 
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
 
Activity Code (LS1) 
1= clearing land 
3=1st ploughing 
 
4=  2nd ploughing 
5= planting 
6=1st weeding 
7=2nd weeding  





13=4th spraying  
14=5th spraying 
15= Harvesting  
16= Watering crops 
 
17= Transporting the produce  
18= Post harvest activities 






Section 12-c.  KNOWLEDGE OF COTTON CULTIVATION DETAILS (SMALL QUIZZ) 
Please ask the following questions to the respondent and circle the answer they give you 
 




QU 7    How many weeks after planting cotton, should SECOND weeding occur? 
_________ 
  
QU 2    Spacing between rows of cotton is how many jerrycans? _________ 
(FO: Show the respondent the length of a 20 ltr jerrycan. 
QU 8   How many weeks after planting cotton does the bollworm arppear 
(FO:show picture of bollworm)? _________ 
QU 3    Spacing between cotton plants is how many jerrycans?:_________ 
(FO: Show the respondent the length of a 20 ltr jerrycan.) 
 
QU9 How many days after planting should you check for seed germination? 
_________ 
QU 4    How many seeds of cotton should you plant in a hole?________ 
 
 
QU 10  If seeds did not germinate, you should replant new seeds, where? 
1=same hole as where you planted the ungerminated seeds 
2=in the gaps between the holes   
QU 5    How many seedlings of cotton should be left in one hole at thinning? 
_________ 
QU 11    Is the bollworm eater (FO:show picture) is harmful to cotton? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
QU 6    How many weeks after planting cotton, should FIRST weeding occur? 
_________ 
 
QU 12    The Lygus Bug (show picture) , which tatters young cotton leaves is bad 























Correct answers (only for researchers, not to be given to enumerators or respondents) 
1    Ladybirds are not harmful insects (show picture).(2) 
2    Spacing between rows is 2-3 jerrycans 
3    spacing between platns is 1 jerrycan 
4    3-5 seeds per hole 
5    Leave 2 seedlings per hole  
6    1st weeding occurs between  the 2nd -3rd week after planting 
7    2nd weeding occurs between the 6th-10th week after planting 
8  Bollworm (show picture) larvae appears between the 8th -9th week after planting 
9  Check germination after 5 days 
10 replant seeds at gaps (2) 
11  The bollworm eater eats the bollworm and is NOT harmful to cotton (2) 
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